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SUPREME COURT SUPREMACY IN A TIME OF
TURMOIL: JAMES V. CITY OF BOISE
Richard Henry Seamon*
Last Term’s decision in James v. City of Boise encapsulates the
current civil rights turmoil and the legal system’s inadequate response
to it. In James¸ the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a decision in which the
Idaho Supreme Court (1) awarded attorney’s fees against a civil rights
plaintiff despite her credible claim of excessive police force and (2)
denied that it was bound by U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the federal statute authorizing the award. Although the Court in James
reaffirmed the state courts’ well-settled duty to obey the Court’s
decisions on federal law, this article shows that the duty rests on
precedent that is shallow—consisting almost entirely of dicta—and
murky in defining the legal source of the duty. This article contributes to
the scholarship by examining the Court’s precedent in some detail and
by proposing that even if state courts need not obey the Court’s decisions
interpreting the federal constitution, they do have a duty to obey the
Court’s decisions interpreting federal statutes.

* Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. I thank the following people who
have reviewed or commented on drafts of this article: Katie Ball, Evan Caminker, Benjamin Cover,
and Jim Pfander. I also thank Kaycee Royer for terrific research assistance. I served (pro bono) as
an attorney for Melene James at the cert petition stage in the case that is the subject of this article,
James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016). The views expressed in this article are mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION
You’d have to go back to the 1960s and ‘70s to find civil rights
turmoil like that of today. To match the current public outrage over
police brutality against people of color, you’d have to revisit Oakland,
California, in 1968, when Black Panthers chanted “Off the Pigs!”1 To
equal the current resistance by state and local officials to federal
actions protecting gay and transgender folks, you’d need to recall state
and local opposition to federal-court orders desegregating public
schools.2 The current turmoil shows up everywhere, including in the
United States Supreme Court’s decision last Term in James v. City of
Boise,3 which is the focus of this Article and which encapsulates the
judicial system’s ultimately unsatisfying response to the turmoil.
In James, the Idaho Supreme Court punished a civil rights
plaintiff for pursuing a police brutality claim and, at the same time,
seemingly denied the U.S. Supreme Court’s authority to control how
state courts enforce federal civil rights.4 The U.S. Supreme Court
summarily reversed the Idaho Supreme Court, reiterating the wellsettled duty of state courts to obey the Court’s decisions on federal
law.5 On the surface, the Court’s opinion in James forcefully reaffirms
the supremacy of the Court and its role in enforcing federal civil rights.
This Article goes beneath the surface in James to show the
disturbing truths. To begin with, the legal basis for the state courts’
duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court decisions on federal law is thinner
and more uncertain than the Court in James suggests.6 Furthermore,
1. JOSHUA BLOOM & WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., BLACK AGAINST EMPIRE: THE HISTORY AND
POLITICS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY 113 (2013). The Black Panther Party rose to national
prominence partly because of the rally it organized in response to the 1967 police shooting of an
African-American man in North Richmond, California, a shooting that all too closely resembles
more recent ones. See Steve Wasserman, Rage and Ruin on the Black Panthers, THE NATION, (June
24, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/rage-and-ruin-black-panthers.
2. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 78–88 (2d ed. 2008).
3. 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016).
4. James v. City of Boise, 351 P.3d 1171, 1171 (Idaho 2015), rev’d 136 S. Ct 685 (2016).
5. James, 136 S. Ct. at 685.
6. Several scholars have addressed in varying levels of detail the state courts’ duty to obey
U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT 22–23, 42–44, 85–
86 (2009) [hereinafter Pfander, ONE SUPREME COURT ]; Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court
Precedent From Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 936–37 & n.79 (2016); James E. Pfander, Federal
Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 199, 228–30 (2007) [hereinafter Pfander, Federal Supremacy]; Amy
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the Idaho Supreme Court’s conduct on remand shows how easily state
courts can defy the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions. Most
disappointing of all, James shows that the Court’s precedent actually
undermines enforcement of federal civil rights, including the right to
be free from excessive police force. Thus, though James got little press
attention because of its summary disposition, the case deserves our
attention for the troubling insights it yields into our current situation.
This Article examines James in five parts. Part I describes the
James case and puts it into the broader context of the current civil
rights turmoil. Part I’s thesis is that the case merited the Court’s
attention, for in many ways it encapsulates the current turmoil. Part II
examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in James and other Court
precedent on the state courts’ duty to obey the Court’s decisions on
federal law. Part II’s thesis is that, although the Court depicts that duty
as long-settled and constitutionally rooted, the foundation for the duty
in Supreme Court case law is surprisingly thin and obscure. Part III
briefly discusses legal scholarship on the state courts’ duty to obey
Supreme Court precedent, and proposes an addendum to the
scholarship that has particular pertinence for James. The proposal
argues that, even if state courts have no duty to obey the Court’s
decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution, they do have a duty to
obey its decisions interpreting Acts of Congress. Part IV discusses the
Idaho Supreme Court’s actions on remand in James. Part IV’s theses
are that (1) the state court’s actions on remand illustrate practical
limitations on the Court’s ability to make state courts obey its
precedent; and (2) in any event, the Court’s precedent undermines
federal civil rights. Part V concludes the Article.

Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 342–43
(2006); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 825, 862–877 (2005); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent,
50 DUKE L.J. 503, 518–19 (2000); Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on
the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143,
1151–52, 1169 (1999); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedent?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 825 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule
of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 390 (1982). None of these scholars
has focused exclusively on the Court’s precedent on that obligation, as this Article does. Nor do
these scholars discuss whether the state courts’ duty to obey the Court’s precedent on the U.S.
Constitution differs from their duty to obey the Court’s precedent interpreting federal statutes. This
Article does so.
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I. JAMES IN CONTEXT
Like many cases that land in the U.S. Supreme Court, James v.
City of Boise has mundane facts: It’s a dog bite case. Likewise, James
seemingly presented a pedestrian legal issue: whether state courts
must obey U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal statutes.
But this Part shows that there is more to the James case than meets the
eye. Section A describes the case, and Section B puts the case into the
relevant context within which the Court no doubt viewed it. Together,
these two parts show that James warranted the Court’s attention, just
as it warrants ours.
A. The Facts and Initial State-Court Proceedings in James
1. The Facts of James
The facts of James show that the mauling of an innocent person
by a police dog could happen to anyone. In hindsight, Ms. James was
not faultless, but the police acted precipitately and their actions caused
her serious physical and emotional harm. Ms. James might not have
deserved to win her later excessive-force claim. But nor did she
deserve to have attorney’s fees awarded against her for bringing it in
a jurisdiction that had no relevant precedent supporting or rejecting it.
On Sunday, December 26, 2010, Melene James was a 49-yearold resident of Boise and worked as a denturist.7 That afternoon, she
had just finished cooking a holiday meal for her family when a friend
called needing emergency work on a denture.8 Ms. James walked half
a block to the building where she leased space to run her small
business, Renaissance Dental Lab.9 She entered the building with her
key and started work on the denture.10 When she reached the point in
her work where the repaired denture needed fifteen minutes to “cure,”
she left the building to smoke a cigarette.11 Then she realized that she
had locked herself out, having left her purse with her keys and cell
phone inside the dental lab.12 This mishap might have been alcohol

7. Clerk’s Record on Appeal at 394, 700, James v. City of Boise, 351 P.3d 1171 (Idaho 2014),
rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 985 (2016) [hereinafter Record].
8. Record, supra note 7, at 394, 700.
9. Record, supra note 7, at 391, 394, 701.
10. Record, supra note 7, at 394, 702.
11. Record, supra note 7, at 395, 701.
12. Record, supra note 7, at 395, 701.
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related: Ms. James later admitted at her deposition that she had been
drinking while cooking the holiday meal.13
Once locked out, Ms. James did not want to leave the immediate
area to call her landlord, because her equipment was still running
inside and posed a fire hazard.14 She accordingly went to a window
that was usually left unlocked to ventilate the dental lab.15 While
trying to open the window, her hand slipped, causing her elbow to hit
the window and break it.16 As she started to climb through the window,
a neighbor who had heard the glass breaking came over and asked her
if she needed help.17 Ms. James told him that she’d locked her keys
inside.18
The neighbor found Ms. James’ behavior peculiar and called
911.19 According to the neighbor’s later account, he told the 911
operator that a woman who’d claimed to have left her keys inside the
building was climbing in through a broken window.20 In the meantime,
Ms. James finished fixing the denture and went to the bathroom.21 It
was while she was in the bathroom that she was attacked by the police
dog.22
While Ms. James was inside the building finishing the denture
repair, police gathered outside the building. Within ten minutes after
the neighbor’s 911 call, the Boise police had created a perimeter
around the building and radioed for a K-9 unit.23 By then, they had
also learned that someone was in the building; An officer had seen Ms.
James through a window of the building; she was standing at a table
with a dental tool in one hand and a can of malt liquor in the other.24
The officer did not try to get her attention.25 Instead, an officer went
inside with the police dog after shouting warnings of his intention to

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Record, supra note 7, at 394, 398.
Record, supra note 7, at 396, 701.
Record, supra note 7, at 396, 397, 701, 702.
Record, supra note 7, at 397, 702.
Record, supra note 7, at 397, 702.
Record, supra note 7, at 397, 702.
Record, supra note 7, at 410, 703.
Record, supra note 7, at 410, 801, 802.
Record, supra note 7, at 397, 398, 702, 703.
Record, supra note 7, at 555.
Record, supra note 7, at 410, 475, 705.
Record, supra note 7, at 414, 429.
Record, supra note 7, at 431.

50.2 SEAMON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

182

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

9/11/18 8:54 PM

[Vol. 50:175

do so.26 The police shouted more warnings after entering the building,
after which the dog-handling officer loosed the dog.27
The dog found Ms. James in the bathroom and, reflecting its “bite
and hold” training, it bit her and held on until its officer-handler
arrived shortly thereafter.28 The officer-handler got the bathroom door
open to find Ms. James lying on the ground with her pants pulled down
below her knees.29 She was then handcuffed, searched, and taken to
the emergency room.30
At the emergency room, Ms. James was found to have a broken
arm and multiple puncture wounds on her cheek, arm, and hand.31 Her
blood alcohol content was 0.27.32 A later medical evaluation reported
that, besides the injuries noted at the emergency room, Ms. James had
a fractured spine and suspected nerve damage.33
2. The Initial State-Court Proceedings in James
Based on the police dog attack, Ms. James sued the City of Boise
and four police officers in Idaho state court.34 She asserted excessiveforce claims against all the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relying
on the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.35 She also asserted
state-law claims.36
The state trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants
and dismissed all of Ms. James’ claims, including her excessive-force
claim under Section 1983.37 The court held that the police did not use
26. Record, supra note 7, at 593, 594.
27. Record, supra note 7, at 593, 594, 710.
28. Record, supra note 7, at 555.
29. Record, supra note 7, at 648, 711.
30. Record, supra note 7, at 594, 711.
31. Record, supra note 7, at 603, 604, 596–600.
32. Record, supra note 7, at 366, 712.
33. Record, supra note 7, at 603, 604, 712.
34. Record, supra note 7, at 6.
35. Record, supra note 7, at 15; See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014)
(“A claim that law-enforcement officers used excessive force to effect a seizure is governed by the
Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ standard.”). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) says in relevant part:
§ 1983. CIVIL ACTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Id.
36. Record, supra note 7, at 14–15.
37. See James v. City of Boise, 351 P.3d 1171, 1177 (Idaho 2015), rev’d 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016).
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unconstitutionally excessive force; rather, their use of force was
“objectively reasonable.”38 Alternatively, the court held that, even if
the police did violate Ms. James’ rights by using excessive force, they
had qualified immunity because those rights were not “clearly
established” when they acted.39
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment for the defendants on all of Ms. James’ claims.40 Unlike the
state trial court, the Idaho Supreme Court did not decide whether the
police violated Ms. James’ constitutional right to be free from
excessive police force.41 Instead, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
the officers had qualified immunity because their conduct did not
violate Ms. James’ “clearly established right[s].”42 In determining
whether Ms. James’ rights were clearly established at the time of the
attack, the Idaho court found no relevant case law in the U.S. Supreme
Court or the Idaho Supreme Court.43 Without binding precedent on her
excessive-force claim, the Idaho Supreme Court looked to precedent
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reviews
federal district court decisions brought in Idaho.44 The Idaho court
determined that “[i]n light of” three Ninth Circuit cases, “it cannot be
concluded that every reasonable official would have understood

38. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at App. 83, James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685 (No.
15–493) [hereinafter James Cert Petition]; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)
(“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is
whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them . . . .”).
39. James Cert Petition, supra note 38, at App. 118; The Court described the doctrine of
qualified immunity this way in a recent excessive-force case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. A clearly established right is one that is
sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is
doing violates that right. We do not require a case directly on point, but existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Put
simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. James, 351 P.3d at 1193.
41. Id. at 1185.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1181–85; see 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (prescribing geographic scope of Ninth Circuit).
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beyond debate that the conduct of the Police in this case violated a
clearly established right.”45
On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the defendants sought an
award of attorney’s fees against Ms. James.46 In seeking the fees that
they had spent battling Ms. James’ appeal on her excessive-force
claim under Section 1983, the defendants relied on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b).47 Section 1988(b) says that in a case arising under Section
1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . .
a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”48
As the Idaho Supreme Court explained, the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted Section 1988(b) in Hughes v. Rowe to hold that “attorney
fees could not be awarded to a prevailing defendant in a case brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 unless the plaintiff’s action was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”49 The Idaho court
45. James, 351 P.3d at 1185 (referring to Miller v. Clark Cnty., 340 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that police dog attack did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights); Chew v.
Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that police officers had qualified immunity from
excessive-force claim based on police dog attack); Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087,
1092 (9th Cir. 1988) (same)).
46. James, 351 P.3d at 1192.
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012) states in relevant part:
§ 1988. PROCEEDINGS IN VINDICATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
...
(b) Attorney’s fees
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92–318, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .
Id.
49. James, 351 P.3d at 1192 (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980)). In contrast to
the “stringent” standard that the Court in Hughes adopted for awarding fees to prevailing defendants
under Section 1988(b) (Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14), the Court had earlier held that prevailing plaintiffs
establishing civil rights violations “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412, 416 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has explained that the different
standards for prevailing defendants and prevailing plaintiffs reflect the “quite different equitable
considerations at stake.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 833 (2011):
When a plaintiff succeeds in remedying a civil rights violation, we have stated, he serves “as a
‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.”
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). He therefore “should
ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee” from the defendant—the party whose misconduct created the
need for legal action. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted). Fee
shifting in such a case at once reimburses a plaintiff for “what it cos[t][him] to vindicate [civil]
rights,” Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577–578 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), and
holds to account “a violator of federal law,” Christiansburg, 434 U.S., at 418.
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remarked that Hughes and the case on which Hughes was based—
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC—”were appeals from cases in
federal district courts.”50 The Idaho Supreme Court asserted that
“[a]lthough the [U.S.] Supreme Court may have the authority to limit
the discretion of lower federal courts, it does not have the authority to
limit the discretion of state courts where such limitation is not
contained in the statute.”51 The statute under analysis, Section
1988(b), does not on its face limit a court’s discretion to award fees.52
“Therefore,” the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, “in cases filed in
the Idaho state courts seeking to recover under 42 U.S.C. section 1988,
the court has discretion in deciding to award attorney fees to the
prevailing party, whether the prevailing party is the plaintiff or the
defendant.”53
Having disclaimed a duty to apply Hughes and Christiansburg’s
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation”54 standard, the Idaho
Supreme Court in fact did not apply that standard.55 Rather, it awarded
fees against Ms. James under Section 1988(b) because “[i]t was clear
that her claim would be barred by qualified immunity under the clearly
established law of the ninth circuit, and the Plaintiff did not cite any
law to the contrary.”56 In contrast, the court denied the defendants’
request for attorney’s fees under the two Idaho statutes that the
defendants cited in seeking fees for the appeal on the state-law
claims.57 The court held that fees were not justified under Idaho Code
§ 12-117 because Ms. James’ appeal on her state-law claims did not
lack “a reasonable basis in fact or law.”58 The court further held that
fees were not warranted under Idaho Code § 12-121 because her
appeal on the state-law claims “was not brought or pursued

In contrast to cases in which the plaintiff prevails, when the defendant in a federal civil rights suit
prevails, awarding the defendant fees under the Christiansburg/Hughes “frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation” standard implements Congress’s intent in Section 1988(b) “to protect
defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S.
at 420.
50. James, 351 P.3d at 1192 (citing Christiansburg, 434 U.S. 412).
51. Id.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012).
53. James, 351 P.3d at 1192.
54. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15; Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
55. James, 351 P.3d at 1192.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1192–93.
58. Id. at 1192; see IDAHO CODE § 12-117 (2016).
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frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.”59 The Idaho court’s
use of a standard identical to the Christiansburg/Hughes standard to
deny fees under an Idaho statute made its failure to use that standard
in awarding fees under Section 1988(b) conspicuous, and obviously
deliberate.
In July 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. James’
petition for rehearing on its award of fees under Section 1988(b).60 As
discussed in Part II, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and
summarily reversed on this aspect of the Idaho Court’s decision in
January 2016.
B. The Context of James
At first blush, the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision did not seem
to warrant the U.S. Supreme Court’s attention. The Idaho court’s error
was obvious. Every law student knows that state courts must follow
U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal law. Indeed, in
summarily reversing the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court cited a 200-year-old case that every law student
studies: Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.61 Moreover, the Idaho Supreme
Court’s error might have been “a sport in the law”—i.e., a decision
“inconsistent with what preceded [it] and what followed [it].”62 After
all, the Idaho Supreme Court had in two earlier decisions applied the
Christiansburg/Hughes “frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation”63 standard in denying attorney’s fees to prevailing
defendants under § 1988(b).64 What is more, no other state court had
denied the binding nature of Christiansburg/Hughes.65
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court “is not, and has never been,
primarily concerned with the correction of error in lower court
decisions.”66 The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision was wrong, but it

59. James, 351 P.3d at 1192–93; see IDAHO CODE § 12–121 (2010).
60. James Cert Petition, supra note 36, at App. 133.
61. James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686 (2016) (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14
U.S. 304 (1816)).
62. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 112 (1945) (plurality opinion of Douglas, J.).
63. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 422 (1978).
64. Nation v. State, Dep’t of Corrections, 158 P.3d 953, 969 (Idaho 2007); Karr v.
Bermeosolo, 129 P.3d 88, 93 (Idaho 2005).
65. See James Cert Petition, supra note 36, at 24–28.
66. Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, 69 S. CT. v, vi (1949).
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was so obviously—and perhaps inadvertently—wrong that it hardly
seemed to merit the Court’s correction.
James has two features that nevertheless made it certworthy.
First, the Idaho court’s error was uninvited and deliberate; it was not
a one-off. Second, the court’s error was highly disturbing considering
its timing and its factual and legal setting. Each feature is explored
briefly below to expose the important issues that are at stake in James
and that almost certainly prompted the grant of certiorari.
1. The Uninvited, Deliberate Nature of the
Idaho Supreme Court’s Error
The Idaho Supreme Court acted sua sponte when it held that
neither it nor other state courts are bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decisions in Christiansburg and Hughes.67 For their part, the
defendants recognized that the Christiansburg/Hughes “frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation”68 standard governed their
request for attorney fees.69 The dispute between the parties focused on
whether or not fees against Ms. James were justified under the
Christiansburg/Hughes standard. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court
injected the issue of whether it was bound by that standard for the first
time when it issued its opinion awarding fees without applying that
standard.
In doing so, the court acted not only sua sponte but deliberately.
Ms. James advised the Court that it was bound by the
Christiansburg/Hughes standard when she sought rehearing on the
court’s award of fees under Section 1988(b). She wrote in her
rehearing petition that “[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, it is a fundamental notion that the decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court interpreting federal statutes and determining
congressional intent are binding upon state courts.”70 The Idaho court
could have deleted the problematic language from its opinion so easily
that its failure to do so in response to the rehearing petition can only
be understood as evidence that it was flouting the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretive authority.

67.
68.
69.
70.

James Cert Petition, supra note 36, at App. 136–37.
Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15; Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
See James Cert Petition, supra note 36, at App. 136–37.
James Cert Petition, supra note 36, at App. 139.

50.2 SEAMON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

188

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

9/11/18 8:54 PM

[Vol. 50:175

2. The Disturbing Context of the Idaho Supreme Court’s Error
The Idaho Supreme Court’s defiance of the Court’s authority was
particularly disturbing in light of its timing and its factual and legal
setting.
a. Timing
When the Idaho Supreme Court denied rehearing in July 2015,
many state and local officials were openly defying the U.S. Supreme
Court’s June 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.71 The defiance
came not only from legislative and executive officials but also state
judges. For example, Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama
Supreme Court said that Obergefell was “not in accordance with the
Constitution.”72 He ordered Alabama probate judges to deny marriage
licenses to same-sex couples on the ground that Obergefell bound only
the parties to the case.73 Justice Moore was not alone: A Mississippi
Supreme Court justice agreed that Obergefell “has no basis in the
Constitution or this Court’s precedent.”74 State judges’ opposition
seemed to gain support from Justice Antonin Scalia, who not only
dissented in Obergefell, but also reportedly said in a later speech that
public officials have “no Constitutional obligation to treat as binding
beyond the parties to a case rulings that lack a warrant in the text or
original understanding of the Constitution.”75
71. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–2605 (2015) (holding that laws in four states
banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional).
72. Charles J. Dean, Moore: Gay Marriage ‘Not in Accordance with the Constitution’, PRESSREGISTER (Alabama Media Group, Mobile, AL), July 1, 2015, at A10.
73. Third Supplement in Support of Complaint of the Southern Poverty Law Center Against
Chief Justice Roy S. Moore at exh. C (Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n) (filed Jan. 6, 2016), available
at https://www.splcenter.org/seeking-justice/case-docket/judicial-ethics-complaint-alabama-chiefjustice-roy-moore-and-same-sex.
74. Czekala–Chatham v. State ex rel. Hood, No. 2014-CA-00008-SCT, 2015 WL 10985118,
at *193 ¶ 15 (Miss. Nov. 5, 2015) (Coleman, J., objecting to order with separate written statement)
(quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
75. Matt Ford, The Quixotic Adventures of Roy Moore, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/alabama-marriage-order-moore/422931/. In
the speech mentioned in the text accompanying this note, Justice Scalia might have been referring
only to nonjudicial government officials. There is longstanding debate about whether a U.S.
Supreme Court decision binds nonjudicial actors who aren’t parties to the case. The Court took the
position in Cooper v. Aaron that its decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution do bind state and
local nonjudicial, non-party officials. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). Well-known legal scholars have
criticized that position. E.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 110–11
(1975); Philip B. Kurland, “Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning”—The School
Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Court: 1954–1979, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 309,
327–28 (1979). The controversy has arisen again in the wake of Obergefell. See, e.g., Czekala–
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Resistance to Obergefell by state judges was joined by resistance
from other quarters. State legislators and governors pushed bills and
executive orders that would facilitate evasion of the decision.76 In
addition, some local officials—the most famous of whom was Rowan
County, Kentucky, Clerk Kim Davis—refused to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples.77 A group of law school and university
professors issued a “Statement Calling for Constitutional Resistance
to Obergefell v. Hodges.”78
Thus, when the Idaho Supreme Court issued its James opinion in
summer 2015, resistance to the U.S. Supreme Court’s supremacy was
widespread.79 You have to wonder if that widespread resistance
emboldened the Idaho Supreme Court’s defiance of the Court’s
precedent in James. Indeed, early commentators on James recognized
the connection between Justice Roy Moore’s position on his duty to
follow Obergefell and the Idaho Supreme Court’s position in James.80
In any event, the timing of the Idaho court’s decision almost certainly
influenced the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in the
case.
b. Factual Context
James arose from the use of a dog to apprehend a criminal
suspect. Although Ms. James is white,81 the use of dogs as a weapon
has historical links to the oppression of blacks. Slave owners in the

Chatham, 2015 WL 10985118, at *14–*17 (Coleman, J., objecting to order with separate written
statement) (discussing Cooper v. Aaron in explaining why state judges might not have to follow
Obergefell).
76. See G.M. Filisko, After Obergefell: The Supreme Court Ruling Settled the Issue of
Marriage Equality—While Unsettling Other Legal Matters, A.B.A. J., June 2016, at 57, 63 (“The
American Civil Liberties Union notes that by the end of April [2016], nearly 200 anti-LGBT bills
had been introduced in 32 states.”).
77. Reuters, Kentucky: Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis Is Again Rebuffed on Licenses, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/us/kentuckyrowan-county-clerkkim-davis-is-again-rebuffed-on-licenses.html?_r=0.
78. Statement Calling for Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell v. Hodges, AM. PRINCIPLES
PROJECT (Oct. 8, 2015), https://americanprinciplesproject.org/founding-principles/statementcalling-for-constitutional-resistance-to-obergefell-v-hodges%E2%80%AF/
[hereinafter
AM.
PRINCIPLES PROJECT].
79. Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A Return to
Separate But Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 911 (2016) (stating that “[t]he backlash to the
Obergefell decision is real and palpable”).
80. Id.
81. Clerk’s Record on Appeal, supra note 5, at 210.
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pre-Civil War South used bloodhounds to hunt for runaway slaves.82
One hundred years later, southern sheriffs like Bull Connor used dogs
against civil rights protestors in Birmingham, Alabama, and other
places of unrest.83 In the 1980s, police began using dogs to apprehend
criminal suspects, a tactic often seen as a tool for abusing people of
color.84
The historical and widespread use of dogs as a weapon—coupled
with the rising number of well-publicized police shootings of black
males in 2015—put the facts of James in a dark setting.85
c. Legal Context
In addition to its factual context, James’ legal context heightened
its importance. Ms. James sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
authorizes private lawsuits challenging state action that violates
federal constitutional or statutory rights.86 Section 1983 “is by far the
most important federal statute permitting civil actions against police
officers.”87 For example, Section 1983 underlies nearly all of the

82. See generally CHRISTINE HATT, SLAVERY FROM AFRICA TO THE AMERICAS 33 (2007);
David Doddington, Slavery and Dogs in the Antebellum South, Sniffing the Past—Dogs & History,
SNIFFING THE PAST (Feb. 23, 2012), https://sniffingthepast.wordpress.com/2012/02/23/slaveryand-dogs-in-the-antebellum-south; Douglas U. Rosenthal, When K-9s Cause Chaos—An
Examination of Police Dog Policies and Their Liabilities, 11 N.Y.L. S CH. J. HUM. RTS. 279, 281
& n.11 (1994) (documenting concern about use of police dogs against minorities in Los Angeles
and other cities); Jim Newton, L.A. Finds Mixed Results in Curbing Police Dog Bites, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 1996), http://articles.latimes.com/1996-03-01/news/mn-41895_1_dog-bite. The use of
bloodhounds to hunt slaves is depicted in the iconic movie Roots. Alberto Nunez Garcia, Whats
Your Name “Kunta Kentei”, YOUTUBE (Feb. 13, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
ByhFz5e5Tno.
83. Jonathan K. Dorriety, Police Service Dogs in the Use-of-Force Continuum, 16 CRIM. J.
POL’Y REV. 88, 90 (2005); Samuel G. Chapman, Police Dogs Versus Crowds, 8 J. POLICE SCI. &
ADMIN. 316, 316 (1980); Jeremy Gray, Bull Connor Used Fire Hoses, Police Dogs on Protestors,
AL. COM (May 3, 2013, 7:07 AM), http://blog.al.com/birmingham-news-stories/2013/05/bull_
connor_ used_fire_hoses_po.html ; Eamon Ronan, Segregation at All Costs: Bull Connor and the
Civil Rights Movement, YOUTUBE (May 7, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
j9kT1yO4MGg.
84. Rosenthal, supra note 75, at 281 & n.11 (reporting that “some officers referred to black
suspects as ‘dog biscuits.’”). See generally William G. Phelps, Liability, Under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983,
for Injury Inflicted by Dogs Under Control or Direction of Police, 102 A.L.R. FED. 616 (1991).
85. Jon Swaine et. al., Young Black Men Killed by U.S. Police at Highest Rate in Year of 1,134
Deaths, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/dec/31/the-counted-police-killings-2015-young-black-men.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), reproduced supra note 33.
87. ANN FAGAN GINGER & LOUIS H. BELL, Police Misconduct Litigation–Plaintiff’s
Remedies, in 15 AM. JUR., TRIALS 555, § 7 (1968).

50.2 SEAMON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

ANALYZING JAMES V. CITY OF BOISE

9/11/18 8:54 PM

191

excessive-force cases that have been decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court.88
More broadly, Section 1983 has historic roots in federal efforts to
force states to respect federal civil rights.89 Section 1983 is the modern
version of a statute enacted after the Civil War. As the U.S. Supreme
Court said of Section 1983’s predecessor, “A major factor motivating
the expansion of federal jurisdiction through §§ 1 and 2 of the [Civil
Rights Act of 1871] was the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state
authorities had been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional
rights of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights.”90
Significantly for James, the “unable or unwilling” state authorities that
concerned the 1871 Congress included “local courts.”91
The concern endures, for some state courts continue to be hostile
to actions under Section 1983 and other federal civil rights statutes.
Their hostility has led to a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions
invalidating state-court refusals to hear federal claims. More recently,
in 2009, the Court in Haywood v. Drown struck down a New York law
that prevented state courts from hearing Section 1983 claims for
money damages against prison guards.92 The Court held that the New
York law violated the Supremacy Clause.93 Even as recently as in this
2009 case, the Court thought necessary to emphasize that “state courts
as well as federal courts are entrusted with providing a forum for the
vindication of federal rights violated by state or local officials acting

88. See, e.g., Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1855 (2016); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305,
307 (2015) (per curiam); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015); Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2018 (2014); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1864 (2014) (per curiam);
Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 194 (2014) (per curiam); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 34–
35 (2010) (per curiam); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375–376 (2007); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516, 521 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734 (2001); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty.,
Okla v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 399–400 (1997); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995); Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1992); Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992); Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991) (per curiam); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); Brower v. Cty.
of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989); City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 797 (1986) (per curiam);
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 317 (1986); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 161–63 (1985);
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 811–12 (1985); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
262–63 (1985); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 755 n.1 (1987); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 653 (1977).
89. Dist. of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423–29 (1973) (discussing history of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983).
90. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 505 (1982).
91. Id. (quoting legislative history).
92. 556 U.S. 729, 729 (2009).
93. Id. at 736.
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under color of state law.”94 The Court added that a state cannot
“dissociate [itself] from federal law because of disagreement with its
content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its source.”95
In saying so, the Court echoed words it had spoken almost a century
before.96
Section 1983’s importance has increased since 1976, when
Congress enacted the provision currently codified in 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b) to authorize awards of attorney’s fees to successful Section
1983 plaintiffs.97 “As was true with § 1983, a major purpose of the
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act—which added the feeshifting provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)—was to benefit those
claiming deprivations of constitutional and civil rights.”98 “Congress
viewed the fees authorized by § 1988 as an integral part of the
remedies necessary to obtain compliance with § 1983.”99
Just as some state courts have resisted hearing Section 1983
claims, several states argued as amici in Maine v. Thiboutot that state
courts need not award fees under Section 1988(b) to prevailing
plaintiffs in Section 1983 actions.100 The Court rejected that argument,

94. Id. at 735; cf. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (“Upon the state courts, equally
with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted
or secured by the constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, . . .”).
95. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736 (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990)) (bracketed
text added by Court in Haywood).
96. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1916) (“[W]here the
general jurisdiction conferred by the state law upon a state court embraced otherwise causes of
action created by an act of Congress, it would be a violation of duty under the Constitution for the
court to refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the United States because of conceptions
of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful
powers.”); see also infra note 166 (citing cases in which the Court has held that states cannot treat
federal law as if it were the law of a foreign country).
97. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012)). Congress enacted the fee-shifting provision
now codified as Section 1988(b) “[t]o provide the [legislative] authorization” that the Court held
in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975), was “required for
fee awards under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as under Reconstruction Era civil
right legislation, and certain other enactments.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 532 U.S. 598, 635 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). (citations
omitted). The Court’s first decision construing Section 1988(b) arose from the 1969 execution of a
search warrant in a Chicago apartment occupied by nine members of the Black Panther Party.
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 755 n.1 (1980) (per curiam).
98. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 (1980).
99. Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 10.
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holding that “the fee provision is part of the § 1983 remedy whether
the action is brought in federal or state court.”101
Section 1988(b) has importance independently of Section 1983.
Section 1988(b) authorizes fee awards in actions under many federal
civil rights statutes besides Section 1983.102 Those statutes include the
Americans with Disabilities Act,103 Title IX,104 the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,105 and Title IV of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.106 Because it covers actions under many civil
rights statutes, Section 1988 is the “most significant federal feeshifting statute.”107
In short, James arose under two federal statutes—Sections 1983
and 1988(b)—that protect federal civil rights and that states have
resisted. This resistance could continue if state courts could construe
Section 1988(b) independently of the U.S. Supreme Court, as the
Idaho court in James held. The Court in Christiansburg and Hughes
deliberately adopted a “stringent” standard for prevailing defendants
to recover attorney fees under § 1988(b), which differed from the
lenient standard it has adopted for awarding fees to prevailing
plaintiffs under that statute.108 The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in
James, however, would allow a state court to adopt a less stringent
standard than that of Christiansburg/Hughes. That would permit
prevailing defendants in Section 1983 actions in state court to recover
fee awards more easily than could prevailing defendants in Section
1983 actions in federal court. That disparity, in turn, would cause all
but ignorant Section 1983 plaintiffs to avoid the state courts. In effect,
this would free states from the obligation that the Court’s precedent
puts them under to entertain Section 1983 suits when their jurisdiction

101. Id. at 10–11.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012), reproduced supra note 89.
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
104. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012) (banning discrimination “on the basis of sex” in college
and university programs that receive federal financial assistance).
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012) (prohibiting religious discrimination in land use
and against inmates).
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in places of public
accommodation based on race, color, religion, or national origin).
107. Martin A. Schwartz, Attorney’s Fees in Civil Rights Cases–October 2009 Term, 27
TOURO. L. REV. 113, 114–15 (2011).
108. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524–25 (1994) (declining to rely on “our feeshifting decisions under the Civil Rights Act” to adopt similar “dual approach” to awarding
attorney’s fees under Copyright Act).
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is otherwise adequate.109 It would also produce a system in which
Section 1983 litigation in state court regularly produced different
outcomes from Section 1983 litigation in federal courts, a disparity
that the U.S. Supreme Court has generally prohibited.110
C. Summary
This Part has shown why the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in
James caught the U.S. Supreme Court’s eye. A state supreme court
held that the U.S. Supreme Court “d[id] not have authority” to make
it obey a decision that interpreted a federal statute to impose
“limitation[s] . . . not contained in the statute.”111 At the time of this
holding, state judges and other officials throughout the country were
refusing to follow Obergefell on the ground that it has no basis in the
Constitution.112 The Idaho court’s decision denied the Court’s
supremacy in a case interpreting federal civil rights statutes that state
courts have resisted enforcing. And the case involved a police tactic,
the use of dogs, with a race-tainted history and modern status,
occurring in a year that witnessed an alarming number of police
killings of black men. James thus eminently deserved the Court’s
attention, as it deserves ours.113
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN JAMES AND OTHER
COURT PRECEDENT ON THE DUTY OF STATE COURTS TO OBEY THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS ON FEDERAL LAW
The Court’s opinion in James—which summarily reverses the
Idaho Supreme Court’s award of attorney’s fees to the defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)—makes the case look easy.114 James is
indeed an easy case if you accept that state courts have a duty to obey
109. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375–81 (1990) (holding that a state court could not refuse
to hear a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it had jurisdiction to hear similar state-law claims).
110. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988) (invalidating enforcement of state statutory
requirement in state-court action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 partly because its enforcement “will
frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in federal civil rights litigation based solely
on whether that litigation takes place in state or federal court”).
111. James v. City of Boise, 351 P.3d 1171, 1192 (Idaho 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 71–79.
113. See SUP. CT. R. 16.1 (stating that after cert papers have been filed, Court can make a
“summary disposition on the merits”).
114. James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016); see also Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S.
785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A summary reversal is . . . usually reserved by this
Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the
decision below is clearly in error.”).
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the Court’s decisions on federal law. But, as this part shows, the
precedent supporting that duty is shallower—and the legal source of
the duty is murkier—than the Court in James would have us believe.
This part uses the James opinion as a springboard for exploring
the state courts’ duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Section
A discusses the James opinion. Section B discusses the case on which
James principally relies: Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee. Section C
discusses other Court precedent on the state court’s duty to obey the
Court’s federal law decisions.
A. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Opinion in James
When the U.S. Supreme Court summarily reverses a lower federal
court or state court decision, it typically issues a short per curiam
opinion explaining that the court below erred.115 The Court’s opinion
in James was short even for a per curiam opinion. The opinion’s legal
analysis consisted of one curt paragraph:
Section 1988 is a federal statute. “It is this Court’s
responsibility to say what a [federal] statute means, and once
the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect
that understanding of the governing rule of law.” Nitro–Lift
Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. ___, ____ (per
curiam) (slip op., at 5) (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). And for good reason. As Justice Story explained
200 years ago, if state courts were permitted to disregard this
Court’s rulings on federal law, “the laws, the treaties, and the
constitution of the United States would be different in
different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the
same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states.
The public mischiefs that would attend such a state of things
would be truly deplorable.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1
Wheat. 304, 348 (1816).116
Thus, the Court cites two modern cases for the relevant rule—i.e., state
courts must obey the Court’s precedent on federal law—and one wellknown case that is supposed to supply the rationale for that rule:
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.117
115. See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 350–51 (10th ed. 2013).
116. James, 136 S. Ct. at 686.
117. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 348 (1816).
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It is understandable that the Court relied on Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee for the rationale. Martin is a foundational case that every law
student studies, and it establishes a power—i.e., the Court’s power to
review state court decisions resting on federal law—that almost no one
today disputes. Thus, the Court’s reliance on Martin in James sends a
strong signal, even a rebuke, to the Idaho Supreme Court for ignoring
a long-settled principle. James also warns a broader audience that it
will brook no resistance of the sort that erupted in response to
Obergefell. Indeed, as mentioned above, early commentators on
James recognized the tie between James and resistance to
Obergefell.118
As discussed in the next section, although the James Court’s
reliance on Martin is understandable, Martin does not support the
result in James as strongly as the Court would have us believe.
B. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee as Precedent for the State Courts’
Duty to Obey U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal Law
The Court in James says that, in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
Justice Story “explained” the “reason” for the state courts’ duty to
obey the Court’s federal-law decisions: ensuring nationwide
uniformity of federal law.119 In reality, Martin never mentions that
duty; at most, Martin implies its existence. Nor does Martin explicitly
identify the legal basis for the duty.
To explore Martin’s weakness as precedent for the state courts’
duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court decisions on federal law, we first
introduce terminology. Two different terms have been used to describe
a court’s duty to obey decisions of a “higher” (or “superior”) court—
i.e., a court that has authority to review (and revise) the first court’s
decisions. In a leading article on the subject, Dean Evan Caminker
calls it the rule of “hierarchical precedent.”120 Other scholars refer to
it as “vertical stare decisis.”121 This Article uses “vertical stare decisis”
because it is more common.122 And this Article discusses a specific
118. See supra text accompanying note 80.
119. James, 136 S. Ct. at 686.
120. Caminker, supra note 6, at 820.
121. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of
Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1774 (2013); Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis
and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1016 n.17 (2003); Harrison, supra note 6, at 514.
122. Whereas vertical stare decisis means a lower court’s duty to obey superior court precedent,
“horizontal stare decisis” means a court’s general policy of abiding by its own past decisions. See,
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manifestation of vertical stare decisis: the duty of state courts to obey
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.123
Martin was not about the state courts’ duty to obey U.S. Supreme
Court precedent. Martin concerned whether the “appellate
jurisdiction” granted to the U.S. Supreme Court in Article III
authorizes the Court to review the decisions of state courts.124 The
Court held in Martin that Article III’s grant of appellate jurisdiction
“does extend to cases pending in the state courts.”125 The issue of
jurisdiction to review a state court decision in a particular case differs
from the issue of whether the Court’s decision in that case binds state
courts in future cases. Therefore, if the Court in Martin had discussed
the latter issue, its discussion would have been dicta.126
In any event, the Court in Martin did not discuss the issue. In the
part of Martin on which the Court relied in James, Justice Story took
pains not to deprecate state court judges’ ability to decide issues of
federal law.127 He had said earlier in the opinion that “[t]he
constitution has presumed . . . that state attachments, state prejudices,
state jealousies, and state interests might sometimes obstruct, or
control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular
administration of justice.”128 But Justice Story added that “[a] motive
of another kind” . . . might [have] induce[d]” the Framers to give the

e.g., Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, in PRECEDENT
IN LAW 81–82 (1987).
123. But cf. Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 437 n.89 (1992)
(arguing that lower federal courts’ duty to obey superior court precedent is not accurately described
as vertical stare decisis because duty “derives from structural rules that are based on the hierarchical
nature of the judicial system, not from the prudential considerations that underlie stare decisis”).
124. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 323–24 (1816) (explaining that the Virginia Court
of Appeals had held, in the decision before the Court, that “the appellate power of the [S]upreme
[C]ourt of the United States does not extend to this court” and that the section of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 providing otherwise “is not in pursuance of the [C]onstitution of the United States”). The
underlying case was a land dispute, with one party, Martin, claiming the land based on treaties and
the other, Hunter’s Lessee, claiming the land based on Virginia law. In its first decision on the
dispute, the Court upheld Martin’s treaty-based claim. Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11
U.S. 603, 625–27 (1813).
125. Martin, 14 U.S. at 351.
126. The discussion was dicta because it was not part of the ratio decidendi of the case. See
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 183–84 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing ratio decidendi); A.G.
GUEST, OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 148 (A.G. Guest ed. 1961) (same); Michael
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1044–76 (2005)
(discussing various definitions of dicta and proposing their own).
127. Martin, 14 U.S. at 347.
128. Id.
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Court appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions.129 That possible
“motive” was “compatible with the most sincere respect for state
tribunals”; it was the “necessity for uniformity of decisions [on federal
law] throughout the . . . United States.”130 Thus, Justice Story offered
the uniformity rationale, upon which the Court relied in James, as a
possible, face-saving justification for the Constitution’s grant of
appellate jurisdiction over state court cases—not as a basis for the state
courts’ duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court decisions on federal law. The
Court never mentioned that duty.
True, the existence of that duty is implied by the Court’s emphasis
on the necessity for nationwide “uniformity of decisions”131 on federal
law. The implication arises from this chain of reasoning, which the
Court in James apparently believed was implicit in Martin:
1. The Framers created the U.S. Supreme Court to ensure
nationwide uniformity in the interpretation and application
of federal law.
2. For the Court to achieve that uniformity, its decisions on
federal law must bind the lower federal courts and state
courts.
3. Therefore, the Constitution requires lower federal courts
and state courts to obey the Court’s decisions on federal law.
If the Court in Martin had expressly engaged in this reasoning to
decide the issue, and the issue had been presented in the case, Martin
would perfectly support the result in James.
By now, however, it should be clear that this is not what Martin
addressed or said. As to the first premise, regarding the Framers’
desire to create uniformity, the Court in Martin offers it only as a
“motive” that “might induce” the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
Court.132 As to the second premise, regarding the necessity of lower
federal and state courts obeying the Court’s decisions, this goes
unstated in Martin.133 Since the Court never mentions the state courts’
129. Id.
130. Id. at 347–48.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 347.
133. Moreover, the premise is dubious. In theory, the U.S. Supreme Court could maintain
uniformity of federal law even if state courts had no duty to obey the Court’s precedent under the
doctrine of vertical stare decisis. Without that doctrine, uniformity would simply be harder to
achieve. As Professor Paulsen wrote, “[t]he asserted need for ‘uniformity’ is not threatened, so long
as the Supreme Court can review and reverse; only the costs of enforcing uniformity are new.”
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duty to obey the Court’s decisions, the Court also never says the duty
is constitutional, nor does it identify any other legal source for it.
Despite these lacunae, it is likely that the Court in Martin did
presume that state courts have a duty to obey the Court’s federal-law
decisions. History confirms the Court’s view that the Framers intended
the Court to produce “uniformity of decisions [on federal law]
throughout the whole United States.”134 This history is admittedly
ambiguous about how uniformity was to be achieved, because the
doctrine of stare decisis had not gelled at the time of the Framing in
England or America.135 Even so, Justice Story, author of the Martin
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover’s
Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIG. 33, 87 (1990).
134. Martin, 14 U.S. at 347–48. Like the Martin opinion, the Federalist Papers contain several
references to the U.S. Supreme Court’s role in ensuring the uniform interpretation of federal law
nationwide, but no explicit mention that state or lower federal courts would be bound by the Court’s
decisions on federal law, much less any suggestion that the Constitution compelled obedience. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that
“[t]o produce uniformity in these determinations [of federal law], they ought to be submitted, in the
last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety
of the judicial power of a government being coextensive with its legislative may be ranked among
the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws decides the
question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the
same laws, is a hydra in government from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can
proceed.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(stating that an appeal from state courts in cases raising issues of federal law “will . . . naturally lie
to that tribunal which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice and the
rules of national decisions”). In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton explained that the life
tenure given to federal judges by the Constitution would attract people of ability who could study
the “strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular
case that comes before them.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); see Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 664 (1999) (suggesting that
Hamilton’s reference to binding nature of precedent in Federalist No. 78 might have been referring
to vertical stare decisis). In addition to the Federalist papers, the papers of James Wilson, who was
both a Framer and an original Justice on the Court, show that he strongly supported vertical stare
decisis. JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 149–50 (James DeWitt Andrews ed.,
1896) (advocating pyramidal court structure with a “superintending tribunal” to resolve conflicting
lower court decisions, and whose determinations “[u]pon future occasions . . . will be considered
as an authority”). See generally Pfander, ONE SUPREME COURT, supra note 6, at 41 (explaining that
England’s Exchequer Chamber “provided the Framers with the tools they needed to construct a
theory of vertical stare decisis”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 770 n.267 (1988) (stating that Framers were familiar with
doctrine of precedent).
135. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The modern concept of
binding precedent . . . came about only gradually over the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.”); CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 150 (1930) (“To sum up the position
[in England] at the end of the eighteenth century: . . . no Judge would have been found to admit
that he was ‘absolutely bound’ by any decision of any tribunal.”); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A
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opinion, said in his 1833 treatise on the Constitution that lower federal
and state courts have a duty to obey the Court’s decisions on federal
law.136 Justice Story traced this duty to “the known course of the
common law” and thought the Framers intended to preserve this
course when they established a supreme court with broad appellate
jurisdiction.137 Accordingly, Justice Story concluded in his treatise
that the Court’s decisions were “conclusive upon the states.”138 Justice
Story might have been wrong in his view that the Framers embedded
in the Constitution the duty of state courts to obey Supreme Court
precedent, but his 1816 decision for the Court in Martin suggests that
his view had gained ascendancy.139
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 308 (1929) (“[I]t is only in the nineteenth century [in
England] that the present system of case law with its hierarchy of authorities was established.”);
Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super–Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 377–78, 378 n.87
(2007) (noting that earliest English decision distinguishing horizontal from vertical stare decisis
dates from 1837); Andrew T. Solomon, A Simple Prescription for Texas’s Ailing Court System:
Stronger Stare Decisis, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 417, 422 n.11 (2006) (“The modern theory of stare
decisis began gradually in the 1800s with the establishment of stricter appellate court hierarchies
and the standardization of case law reporting.”); Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional
Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 89 (2001) (“American commitment to precedent
strengthened in the first half of the nineteenth century . . . .”); Lee, supra note 124, at 661 (stating
that “most legal historians have agreed that the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries marked
an important point of transition” in doctrine of precedent); Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and
Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 50 (1959) (“[T]he
formative period of the doctrine [of stare decisis in America] . . . was 1800 to 1850”).
136. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 349 (1833) (posing question
whether decision of the Court, “when made, is conclusive and binding upon the states”); id. at 349–
50 (answering yes to that question).
137. Story states:
[J]udicial decisions of the highest tribunal, by the known course of the common law, are
considered, as establishing the true construction of the laws, which are brought into controversy
before it. The case is not alone considered as decided and settled; but the principles of the
decision are held, as precedents and authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is
the constant practice under our whole system of jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with
them, when they first emigrated to this country . . . .This known course of proceeding, this
settled habit of thinking, this conclusive effect of judicial adjudications, was in the full view of
the framers of the constitution. . . . It would seem impossible, then, to presume, if the people
intended to introduce a new rule in respect to the decisions of the Supreme Court, and to limit
the nature and operations of their judgments in a manner wholly unknown to the common law,
and to our existing jurisprudence, that some indication of that intention should not be apparent
on the face of the constitution. . . . If the judgments of the Supreme Court upon constitutional
questions are conclusive and binding upon the citizens at large, must they not be equally
conclusive upon the states?
STORY, supra, note 136, at 349–50.
138. STORY, supra, note 136, at 350.
139. Professor David Engdahl believes that Justice Story was wrong to assert a constitutional
basis for stare decisis. David E. Engdahl, What’s in a Name: The Constitutionality of Multiple
Supreme Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457, 502 n. 225 (1991) (arguing that “[n]otwithstanding the adamant
and relatively early voice of Joseph Story, stare decisis has no proper place in constitutional law”).
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Nonetheless, considering how much you must read into the
Martin decision to make it support the decision in James, Martin
constitutes weak precedent. The Court in James was eliding, if not
disguising, this weakness when it said that in Martin Justice Story
“explained” the “reason” why state courts cannot be “permitted to
disregard this Court’s rulings on federal law.”140 Given the weakness
of Martin as precedent for the result in James, you have to wonder
why the Court relied on it: Didn’t it have any better precedent?
As discussed in the next section, the answer is “not really.” The
other precedent is surprisingly shallow, and furnishes an uncertain
legal basis for the state courts’ duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on federal law.
C. Other U.S. Supreme Court Precedent on the State Courts’ Duty
to Obey U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal Law
1. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on the Court’s Appellate
Jurisdiction Over State-Court Decisions
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee is one of a quartet of early cases in
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that its appellate jurisdiction under
Article III authorizes it to review certain state court decisions. The
other three cases in the quartet do not add much support for the
existence of the state courts’ duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court
decisions on federal law.
The cases are Cohens v. Virginia,141 Dodge v. Woolsey,142 and
Ableman v. Booth.143 None of them presented the issue of whether
state courts have a duty to obey the Court’s decisions on federal law.144

This Article is agnostic about the accuracy of Justice Story’s account. If the account is accurate,
however, then vertical stare decisis might be most usefully understood as a constitutional backdrop,
as Professor Sachs has argued. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1813, 1863–66 (2012).
140. James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686 (2016).
141. 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
142. 59 U.S. 331, 350 (1855).
143. 62 U.S. 506 (1858).
144. In Cohens, Virginia contested the Court’s jurisdiction to review a Virginia state court
decision in which the defendants argued that the state law under which they were convicted (for
selling lottery tickets) violated the U.S. Constitution. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 413. In Dodge, the
defendants in a federal-court, diversity-of-citizenship case argued that the state courts had exclusive
and final jurisdiction, despite the presence of an issue of federal law. Dodge, 59 U.S. at 346. In
Ableman, the issue was whether a state court could grant habeas corpus relief to someone who was
in federal custody for violating a federal criminal statute. Ableman, 62 U.S. at 514 (noting that
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Moreover, none of them, with the arguable exception of Dodge,
expressly addressed the existence of the duty or the legal basis for it.145
They do, however, emphasize the importance of nationwide
uniformity in the interpretation of federal law.146 Since uniformity
would be hard to achieve unless the Court’s decisions on federal law
bound state courts, the decisions imply that state courts have a duty to
obey the Court’s federal-law decisions. Like Martin, however, these
decisions lack the “canonical language” recognizing the duty that one
would expect from precedent on such a fundamental principle.147
The Court’s decision in Dodge has two features that arguably
make it stronger precedent than Martin, Cohens, and Ableman. First,
the Dodge decision contains language that apparently alludes to the
duty of state courts to obey the Court’s precedent. The Court says that
its decision in the case—which presented a federal constitutional
challenge to an Ohio law that taxed state-chartered banks—will affect
not only “[m]illions of money in that State” but also “millions upon
millions of banking capital in other States.”148 Second, the decision
lengthily argues that “the constitution itself” makes the Court the
“final judge of the powers of the constitution [and] . . . the
interpretation of the laws of Congress.”149

Wisconsin Supreme Court “ordered their clerk to disregard and refuse obedience to the writ of
error” issued by the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Wisconsin court’s decisions).
145. Ableman, 62 U.S. at 518 (“It was essential . . . to [the federal government’s] very
existence” to establish “a tribunal . . . in which all cases which might arise under the Constitution
and laws and treaties of the United States, whether in a State court or a court of the United States,
should be finally and conclusively decided.”); Dodge, 59 U.S. at 350 (“[O]ur national union would
be incomplete and altogether insufficient for the great ends contemplated, unless a constitutional
arbiter was provided to give certainty and uniformity, in all of the States, to the interpretation of
the constitution and the legislation of congress.”); Cohens, 19 U.S. at 416 (“[T]he necessity of
uniformity, as well as correctness in expounding the constitution and laws of the United States,
would itself suggest the propriety of vesting in some single tribunal the power of deciding, in the
last resort, all cases in which they are involved.”).
146. See infra text accompanying notes 148–58 (discussing Dodge).
147. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 579 (1987); see also Larry
Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1989) (stating that, in rule-based
model of precedent, rule “must have a canonical formulation”).
148. Dodge, 59 U.S. at 356. The Ableman opinion also arguably contains language suggesting
that the Court’s decisions on federal law bind state courts. It refers to the Court as the
constitutionally designated tribunal in which federal questions “should be finally and conclusively
decided.” Ableman, 62 U.S. at 518. Yet this language is ambiguous; it leaves unclear whether the
Court’s decision is “final” only as to the parties to the case, or has broader effect. See David E.
Engdahl, supra note 139, at 459 (stating that “[t]he word ‘finality’ alone . . . is insufficient to
distinguish Supreme Court ‘judicial review’ . . . from simple res judicata”).
149. Dodge, 59 U.S. at 351, 358.
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Despite its two strengths, Dodge also has two weaknesses that
make it problematic as precedent for the state courts’ duty to obey the
U.S. Supreme Court’s federal-law decisions.
First, the constitutional analysis in Dodge is vague and muddled.
The Court does not identify a particular part of the Constitution
requiring state courts to obey the Court’s decisions on federal law.150
Rather, it meanders through much of the original Constitution,
mentioning among other parts of it Article III’s grant of appellate
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court151; the States’ implicit surrender of
sovereignty through Article VII’s provision for state-by-state
ratification of the Constitution;152 the Supremacy Clause;153 and the
Constitution’s creation of a Supreme Court.154 Perhaps the muddiness
of the Dodge Court’s analysis explains why the Court has never cited
Dodge as precedent for the state courts’ duty to obey the Court’s
federal-law decisions.155
The second problematic feature of Dodge is its aftermath. After
the Court decided Dodge, the Ohio Supreme Court—whose decision
was reversed in Dodge—held that it was not bound by the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision!156 The Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis is
cogent (even if wrong) compared to Dodge’s.157 Predictably, the U.S.
150. See id. at 358 (asserting that the Court had “shown from the constitution itself that the
framers of it meant to provide a jurisdiction for its final interpretation, and for the laws passed by
Congress, to give them an equal operation in all of the States”).
151. Id. at 347.
152. Id. at 348.
153. Id. at 348–49, 355.
154. Id. at 355–58.
155. Cf. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 450, 458–59 (1881) (stating that, in
Dodge opinion, “it is impossible not to see the influence . . . of the fact that the only question on
the merits of the case was one which peculiarly belonged to the Federal judiciary, and especially to
this court to decide”).
156. Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. 436 (1861).
157. The Ohio Supreme Court in Skelly said, “There is no constitutional nor legislative
provision which makes the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in one case, binding,
as a precedent for the decision of a similar case.” 9 Ohio St. at 609. The Ohio court then addressed
Justice Story’s view, expressed in his Commentaries, that the state courts’ duty to obey U.S.
Supreme Court precedent flowed from the Framers’ “tacit adoption” of the English system’s rule
of vertical stare decisis. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 136–38 (summarizing Justice
Story’s view in the Commentaries). The Ohio court in Skelly contended that the duty of lower courts
in England to obey superior court precedent “without any inquiry into their correctness has been
clearly admitted only in modern times.” 9 Ohio St. at 610. Most legal scholars appear to agree. See
supra note 135. Moreover, the Ohio court in Skelly argued that, for purposes of vertical stare decisis,
state courts should not be treated as “inferior” to the U.S. Supreme Court because (at that time)
Congress had not authorized the U.S. Supreme Court to review all state-court decisions resting on
federal law. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court could review a state-court decision only if the state
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Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court decision refusing to
follow Dodge. That would have been the perfect time for the Court to
address the squarely presented issue of the state courts’ duty to obey
the Court’s precedent. But the Court voiced not a peep about that duty.
Instead, the Court querulously remarked that it had already held the
Ohio statutes unconstitutional three times before.158 From the
standpoint of the Court’s supremacy over state courts in matters of
federal law, Dodge ends not with a bang but a whimper.
So far we have discussed cases in which the Court has not
expressly said that state courts have a duty to obey U.S. Supreme
Court decisions on federal law. Next we turn to cases that do say so.
As we will see, many of them have their own problems serving as
precedent for this duty.
2. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on the Court’s Policy of Accepting
State Supreme Court Interpretations of
State Constitutions and Statutes
In many cases, the Court has held that it is generally bound by
state supreme court decisions interpreting state constitutions and
statutes.159 In several cases, the Court has expressly said that, by the
same token, state courts are bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the federal constitution and statutes. This section
discusses three early cases to show that (1) the Court’s decisions in
these cases, unlike the Martin quartet, do expressly say state courts
must obey the Court’s decisions on federal law; (2) the statements are
dicta; and (3) the cases do not agree on the legal source of the state
courts’ duty.
court had rejected a federal claim or defense, and not if the state court had upheld the federal claim
or defense. Skelly, 9 Ohio St. at 612 (stating that “the limited and qualified character of the appellate
jurisdiction, conferred by the 25th section of the judiciary act [of 1789], does not countenance the
idea . . . that Congress had in view a uniformity of decisions upon questions arising under the
constitution and laws of the United States, and that the Supreme Court was the common arbiter for
the decision of such questions”).
158. Jefferson Branch, 66 U.S. at 448 (“It has been decided three times by this court . . . that
the acts of Ohio, upon which the Supreme Court of Ohio has assumed the State’s right to tax the
State Bank of Ohio and its branches differently from the taxes stipulated for in the . . . [bank’s]
charter, were and are unconstitutional and void”).
159. See, e.g., Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 488
(1976) (accepting state supreme court’s interpretation of state statute). The general rule stated in
the text has exceptions. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court
Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1924 (2003)
(referring to “a deeply embedded understanding that state-court determinations of state law in
federal cases are open to some reexamination by the [U.S.] Supreme Court”).
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The earliest case is Elmendorf v. Taylor.160 In Elmendorf, the
Court reviewed a Kentucky state court decision in a land dispute.161
One issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff’s entry onto the
disputed land was “notorious” enough to satisfy relevant state
statutes.162 In an opinion for the Court by Chief Justice John Marshall,
the Court said that “a considerable contrariety of opinion . . . would
prevail” if the Court had to decide the issue itself.163 That would be
unnecessary, however, if the issue had been resolved by the courts of
Kentucky, for their interpretation of Kentucky statutes would bind the
U.S. Supreme Court:
This Court has uniformly professed its disposition, in cases
depending on the laws of a particular State, to adopt the
construction which the Courts of the State have given to
those laws. This course is founded on the principle, supposed
to be universally recognized, that the judicial department of
every government, where such department exists, is the
appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that
government. Thus, no Court in the universe, which professed
to be governed by principle, would, we presume, undertake
to say, that the Courts of Great Britain, or of France, or of
any other nation, had misunderstood their own statutes, and
therefore erect itself into a tribunal which should correct such
misunderstanding. We receive the construction given by the
Courts of the nation as the true sense of the law, and feel
ourselves no more at liberty to depart from that construction,
than to depart from the words of the statute.164
“On this principle,” the Court continued, “the construction given
by this Court to the constitution and laws of the United States is
received by all as the true construction.”165 This clearly means that the
Court’s construction of the federal constitution and statutes binds
“all,” including state courts. It is dicta, however, because the issue was
160. 23 U.S. 152 (1825).
161. Id. at 157–59.
162. Id. at 158–59. (describing defendants’ argument that law temporarily prohibiting the
surveyor from giving copies of the surveyed land to anyone other than the land’s owner of record
“excludes the idea of that notoriety which is ascribed to a record,” and plaintiff’s “den[ial] that the
notoriety attached to a record is dependent entirely on the right to demand a copy of it”).
163. Id. at 159.
164. Id. at 159–60.
165. Id. at 160.
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not before the Court, nor was the statement necessary to the Court’s
reasoning.
The second early case, Green v. Neal’s Lessee, concerned the
proper interpretation of two Tennessee statutes.166 The Court in Green
quoted Elmendorf’s holding that “the courts of the United States, in
cases depending on the laws of a particular state, will, in general adopt
the construction which the courts of the state have given to those
laws.”167 The Court in Green also addressed, in dicta, the converse
situation:
On all questions arising under the constitution and laws of
the union, this court may exercise a revising power; and its
decisions are final and obligatory on all other judicial
tribunals, state as well as federal. A state tribunal has a right
to examine any such questions, and to determine thereon; but
its decision must conform to that of the Supreme Court, or
the corrective power may be exercised.168
In this passage, Green rests the state courts’ duty to “conform to” the
Court’s federal-law decisions on the Court’s “revising” (or
“corrective”) power—i.e., its appellate jurisdiction under Article
III.169
Thus, Green and Elmendorf cite different grounds for the state
courts’ duty to obey the Court’s federal-law decisions. Whereas Green
relies on the Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III, Elmendorf
had relied on “the principle, supposed to be universally recognized,
that the judicial department of every government . . . is the appropriate
organ for construing the legislative acts of that government.”170 Green
quotes this “principle” from Elmendorf, but only as the basis for the
Court’s acceptance of state supreme court interpretations of state
statutes, and not as the basis for the state court’s duty to obey U.S.
Supreme Court precedent on federal law.171

166. Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 31 U.S. 291, 293–94 (1832). Green, like Elmendorf, was a land
dispute. Id. at 292–93. The statutes at issue in Green were Tennessee statutes of limitations. Id. at
293.
167. Green, 31 U.S. at 297 (quoting Elmendorf, 23 U.S. at 159).
168. Id. at 298.
169. Id.
170. Elmendorf, 23 U.S. at 159; see also id. (stating that “[o]n this principle” the Court’s
decisions construing the Constitution and federal statutes “is received by all as the true
construction”).
171. Green, 31 U.S. at 297 (quoting Elmendorf, 23 U.S. at 152).
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There is a problem with Elmendorf’s ground for the state courts’
duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court decisions on federal law. The
universal principle that it cites—i.e., “that the judicial department of
every government . . . is the appropriate organ for construing the
legislative acts of that government”172—comes from conflict-of-laws
doctrine on proving the law of foreign nations.173 As such, the
principle treats state courts and federal courts as foreign to each
other.174 That treatment contradicts Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee and
other decisions holding that state and federal courts are not analogous
to the courts of independent sovereigns.175 Similarly, the Court has
repeatedly rejected the notion that state courts can treat federal law as
if it were the law of a foreign country.176 Given the tension between
Elmendorf’s rationale and the Court’s other precedent, it is not
surprising that this rationale does not reappear in Green or any other
later decision.177

172. Elmendorf, 23 U.S. at 159.
173. Id. at 160; Green, 31 U.S. at 297. See also Arthur Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving
Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1032–33 n.84 (1941) (discussing “universal principle” expressed
in Elmendorf as “a sound phase of the fact theory” of proving foreign law); Kermit Roosevelt III,
Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1821, 1891 n.225 (2005) (citing Elmendorf in stating that “[t]he basic idea that nationstates are authoritative interpreters of their own law occupies a . . . fundamental place in
international law”).
174. See Elmendorf, 23 U.S. at 159–60 (stating that “no Court in the universe, which professed
to be governed by principle, would, we presume, undertake to say, that the Courts of Great Britain,
or of France, or of any other nation, had misunderstood their own statutes, and therefore erect itself
into a tribunal which should correct such misunderstanding”).
175. See Martin, 14 U.S. at 344 (rejecting argument that state judges “possess an absolute
independence of the United States”); see also Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734–35 (2009)
(stating that “courts of the two jurisdictions [i.e., state and federal] are not foreign to each other,
nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country”) (quoting Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136–37 (1876)); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S.
211, 222 (1916) (stating that Constitution “cause[s] the governments and courts of both the nation
and the several states not to be strange or foreign to each other . . . but to be all courts of a common
country”).
176. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947) (“[W]e cannot accept the basic premise . . . that
[the Rhode Island Supreme Court] has no more obligation to enforce a valid penal law of the United
States than it has to enforce a penal law of another state or a foreign country.”); see Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) (stating that “[f]ederal law is enforceable in state courts . . . because
the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the
state legislature”); Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912)
(stating that “[t]he United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several states” (quoting
Claflin, 93 U.S. at 136)).
177. Cf. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175, 210 n.55 (1863) (Miller, J., dissenting)
(citing Elmendorf in discussing Court’s duty to follow state supreme court decisions construing
state statutes and constitutions and the “correlative proposition that to this court belongs the right
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In contrast, Green’s reliance on the Court’s Article III appellate
jurisdiction does appear in later decisions recognizing the state courts’
duty to obey the Court’s federal-law decisions. One later case, like
Elmendorf and Green, is about the Court’s acceptance of state
supreme court interpretations of state statutes: Provident Institute for
Savings v. Massachusetts.178
In Provident, the Court reviewed a decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court rejecting a federal constitutional challenge to a state
tax law.179 The Court said that the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s
“construction of the . . . tax laws of the State [in past decisions] . . .
ought to be regarded as authorities in this court.”180 On the other hand,
the Court said, “State decisions involving questions re-examinable
here“—i.e., questions of federal law—”can have no authoritative
influence in this court, because the State courts in deciding those few
questions act in a subordinate relation to the paramount jurisdiction of
this court . . . .”181 That subordinate relation flows from the Court’s
interpretation of its appellate jurisdiction in Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee. 182 Thus, Provident, like Green, relies on the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction as the basis for the state courts’ duty to obey the Court’s
decisions on federal law.
The Court followed Green and Provident in later decisions
recognizing the state court’s duty to obey its federal-law precedent.
The decisions included ones that—like Elmendorf, Green, and
Provident—addressed the duty in dicta when reaffirming the Court’s
policy of following state supreme court decisions construing state
constitutions and statutes. 183 Next we turn to modern decisions
discussing the state courts’ duty outside that context.

to expound conclusively, for all other courts, the Constitution and laws of the Federal
Government”).
178. 73 U.S. 611, 621 (1867).
179. Id. at 620–21.
180. Id. at 628.
181. Id.; see also Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 31 U.S. 291, 298 (1832) (citing Court’s “revising
power” in explaining that the Court’s “decisions are final and obligatory on all other judicial
tribunals, state as well as federal”).
182. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
183. See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 632 (1874) (stating in dicta that the
Constitution and federal statutes give the Court “the right to decide [federal] questions finally and
in a manner which would be conclusive on all other courts, State or National”).
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3. Modern U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on the State Courts’ Duty
to Obey U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal Law
After the 19th century, the Court continued to recognize the state
courts’ duty to obey the Court’s decisions on federal law.184 To the
extent these modern decisions address the legal basis for this duty,
they trace it to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III, as
construed in Martin. The modern cases, like the earlier cases, are
remarkable for the almost total absence of cases in which the state
courts’ duty is directly at issue. Indeed, this author’s research has
uncovered only one decision before James that squarely presented the
issue. That case was cited in James: Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v.
Howard.185 This subsection discusses Nitro-Lift and the precedent on
which it relies.
In Nitro-Lift, the Court reviewed a decision of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court declaring two noncompetition agreements invalid
under Oklahoma law.186 Although those agreements had arbitration
clauses, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided the validity of the
agreements itself, rather than leaving the issue to the arbitrator.187 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court “chose to discount” decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to
require an arbitrator, not a court, to decide the validity of agreements
with valid arbitration clauses.188 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
“acknowledged” these decisions, but concluded that “its ‘[own]
jurisprudence controls this issue.’”189
The U.S. Supreme Court summarily vacated the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s judgment in Nitro-Lift.190 The Court held that its
decisions interpreting the FAA, like the FAA itself, are equally
applicable in, and binding on, the state courts and the lower federal
courts:
184. E.g., South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 420 (1933) (stating on review in state-court
habeas case that “it was the duty of [the state] court to administer the law prescribed by the
Constitution and statute of the United States, as construed by this court”).
185. 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (per curiam). Nitro-Lift Technologies is discussed in James Cert
Petition, supra note 38, at 686.
186. Nitro-Lift Techs., 133 S. Ct. at 502.
187. Id. at 503 (stating that the Oklahoma Supreme Court “assumed the arbitrator’s role by
declaring the noncompetition agreements null and void”).
188. Id. at 502–03; see 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012) (Federal Arbitration Act).
189. Nitro-Lift Techs., 133 S. Ct. at 503 (quoting Oklahoma Supreme Court’s opinion;
bracketed text inserted by Court in Nitro-Lift Technologies).
190. Id. at 504.
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[T]he Oklahoma Supreme Court must abide by the FAA,
which is “the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const., Art.
VI, cl. 2, and by the opinions of this Court interpreting that
law. “It is this Court’s responsibility to say what a statute
means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other
courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of
law.” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312
(1994).191
The Court cited the Supremacy Clause as the basis for the state courts’
duty to obey the FAA, but not for their duty to obey the Court’s
decisions construing the FAA.192 For the latter duty, it cited Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc.193
In Rivers, a case from a lower federal court, the Court discussed
the binding nature of its statutory-interpretation decisions when
addressing the retroactive nature of those decisions.194 Specifically,
the Court said that, once it had authoritatively interpreted 42 U.S.C. §
1981 in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,195 earlier lower federal
court decisions adopting a contrary interpretation “were incorrect.”196
The Court in Rivers explained, “They were not wrong according to
some abstract standard of interpretive validity, but by the rules that
necessarily govern our hierarchical federal court system.”197 Under
that system, the Court concluded, “It is this Court’s responsibility to
say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty
of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of
law.”198
Within the “hierarchical federal court system,”199 the lower
federal courts are “inferior” to the U.S. Supreme Court under the

191. Id. at 503.
192. Id. The Court in Nitro-Lift Technologies might have avoided citing the Supremacy Clause
to avoid invidious comparisons to Cooper v. Aaron, in which the Court relied on the Clause to
equate its interpretations of the Constitution to the text of the Constitution. Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
193. Nitro-Lift Techs., 133 S. Ct. at 503.
194. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 303 (1994) (noting that the Court was
reviewing Sixth Circuit decision).
195. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
196. Rivers, 511 U.S. at 312.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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express terms of Article III of the Constitution.200 In contrast, the state
courts are inferior to the Court (when it comes to deciding issues of
federal law) not under the express terms of Article III but under the
Court’s interpretation of Article III in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.201
Thus, Nitro-Lift indicates by its reliance on Rivers that the state courts’
duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal
statutes ultimately rests on that Court’s appellate jurisdiction under
Article III, as construed in Martin. In this way, Nitro-Lift returns us to
Martin as the primary precedent, weak as it is, for the state courts’
duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
4. Summary
Research reveals only one decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
besides James—the 2012 decision in Nitro-Lift, LLC v. Howard202—
that has held, and not just said in dicta, that state courts have a duty to
obey the Court’s decisions on federal law.203 Nitro-Lift’s holding
ultimately rests on Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, which does not
expressly articulate that duty, even in dicta, but is nonetheless most
reasonably read to imply the duty’s existence. 204 Partly because NitroLift can be traced back to Martin, Nitro-Lift seems to rest the state
courts’ duty on the Constitution: specifically, Article III’s grant of
appellate jurisdiction.205
In the almost 200 years between Martin and Nitro-Lift, the Court
has repeatedly recognized the state courts’ duty, but only in dicta. And
200. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting judicial power in “one supreme Court, and in such interior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”); see also Caminker, supra
note 6, at 828–38 (arguing that lower federal courts’ duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court decisions is
justified by Article III’s use of terms “supreme” and “inferior,” but state courts’ duty to obey U.S.
Supreme Court decisions “must rest on other grounds”).
201. 14 U.S. 304, 325, 343–44 (1816) (stating that “the people had a right . . . to make the
powers of the state governments, in given cases, subordinate to those of the nation” and, later in its
opinion, that Court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction over state courts is consistent with provisions
in Constitution that “restrain or annul the sovereignty of the states”); cf. Pfander, ONE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 6, at 81–92 (arguing that, for certain matters, Congress can constitute state
courts as Article I tribunals under U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, and that this would make them
“inferior tribunals” obligating them to obey U.S. Supreme Court precedent; as to other matters,
statutory developments have caused them to be treated more generally as inferior courts analogous
to lower federal courts).
202. 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (per curiam).
203. As discussed above, the issue was squarely presented in Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly,
66 U.S. 436 (1861), but the Court passed it by. See supra notes 147–48.
204. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
205. See Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012).
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although Martin’s author, Joseph Story, believed that this duty rested
on common law, later decisions of the Court have suggested other
legal bases for the duty, including a principle of international choice
of law (in Elmendorf),206 a congeries of constitutional provisions (in
Dodge),207 and, finally, Article III’s grant of appellate jurisdiction to
the U.S. Supreme Court (in Green and later cases).208
This discussion has shown that the precedent supporting the state
courts’ duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court precedent is shallow—in the
sense that all but one of the decisions expressly addressing the issue
do so in dicta, and others do so only implicitly—and is murky—in the
sense that the decisions are not consistent in identifying the legal basis
for the duty. It is not much of an oversimplification to say that state
courts must obey U.S. Supreme Court precedent because U.S.
Supreme Court precedent says so.209
This is not to say that the precedent is wrong.210 Nor is it to say
that the issue is easy. On the contrary, the difficulty of the issue is
shown by the legal scholarship on the issue, which is discussed in the
next part of this Article, along with a proposal that supplements the
scholarship and addresses the specific issue presented in James:
whether state courts must obey the Court’s decisions interpreting
federal statutes.
III. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP ON THE STATE COURTS’ DUTY TO OBEY THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT’S FEDERAL-LAW DECISIONS; AND A MODEST
PROPOSED ADDENDUM
Legal scholars have not done much better than the Court in
establishing the existence and source of the state courts’ duty to obey
the Court’s decisions on federal law. Scholars disagree on whether or

206. See supra text accompanying notes 160–65 (discussing Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. 152
(1825)).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 148–58 (discussing Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331,
348–58 (1855)).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 166–69 (discussing Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 31 U.S.
291, 293–94 (1832), and later cases).
209. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) (“We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”), cited in Rivers
v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994).
210. To the contrary, I agree with Dean Caminker that, quite apart from any constitutional
underpinnings, vertical stare decisis “has a plausible normative foundation” to the extent that it
promotes “consistent interpretation and application of law,” because that result serves “important
values undergirding a government dedicated to the rule of law.” Caminker, supra note 6, at 854.
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not the duty exists.211 Those who believe in the duty’s existence
disagree on whether or not it is compelled by the Constitution.212 And
those who believe the duty is constitutional disagree on the specific
part of the Constitution from which it springs.213
It would take a separate article to weigh in on this debate
comprehensively. This part instead proposes a modest addendum to
the debate that might further the scholarly inquiry and that has special
pertinence to the precise issue before the Court in James. The proposal
makes a distinction that the scholarship to date has not made: namely,
between the state courts’ duty to obey the Court’s decisions
interpreting the federal Constitution and its decisions interpreting
federal statutes.214
211. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note 6, at 197–99 & 232–34 (arguing that Congress
has constituted state courts as “tribunals inferior to the supreme Court” under U.S. Const. art. I, 8,
cl. 9, as a result of which they must obey Supreme Court precedent); Harrison, supra note 6 at 518
(stating that “it is not obvious . . . that [Art. III’s grant to the Court of] appellate jurisdiction
determines the scope of stare decisis”); Caminker, supra note 6, at 838, 865–66 (arguing that state
courts’ duty to obey Court’s decisions is not compelled by Article III but that “the values that inhere
in a uniform interpretation and application of law . . . strongly support inferior federal court (and
state court) deference to Supreme Court rulings”); Engdahl, supra note 139, at 502 n.225 (arguing
that “stare decisis has no proper place in constitutional law”); Farber, supra note 6, at 390 (arguing
that “Court’s decisions are at least a form of federal common law” that bind state courts “under the
supremacy clause”); see also Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in
Judicial Opinions, 61 TULANE L. REV. 1041, 1057–1058 (1987) (arguing that, “[f]rom the
deductive perspective,” “[t]he rules binding lower courts to adhere to precedent are . . . not
compulsory but suasive”).
212. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note 6, at 197–99 & 232–34 (tracing state courts’ duty
to Congress’s enacting legislation that constitutes state courts as “tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court” under U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 9); Caminker, supra note 6, at 838 (stating that although “the
Constitution most plausibly requires inferior federal courts to defer to Supreme Court precedents,
equivalent obligations demanding . . . state courts to follow federal court precedent must rest on
other grounds”); Harrison, supra note 6, at 522 (stating that “the force of precedent came, not from
anything intrinsic to the [Article III] judicial power, but from the common law rules of stare
decisis”); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 258 n.170 (1985) (tracing state courts’ duty to obey
Supreme Court precedent to “the mechanisms of review that Congress provides for”); Farber, supra
note 6, at 408–11 (arguing that Supreme Court’s decisions constitute “law” that binds state courts
under the Supremacy Clause).
213. See supra note 200.
214. Many scholars have addressed the stare decisis effect of the Court’s decisions interpreting
the Constitution without addressing the stare decisis effect of the Court’s decisions interpreting
federal statutes. See David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 929, 930–40 (2008) (referring to the “outpouring” of
scholarship “on the proper role of precedent in constitutional cases, and summarizing this
scholarship). Other scholars have addressed stare decisis in general terms that do not distinguish
between precedent interpreting the Constitution and precedent interpreting federal statutes. See,
e.g., Alexander, supra note 147, at 5 (separately discussing precedent in common-law decision
making and precedent in constitutional and statutory interpretation); Charles L. Barzun,
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The proposal argues that, even if the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decisions interpreting the Constitution do not bind the state courts, its
decisions interpreting federal statutes do. To paraphrase a decision of
the Court from a different context: When Congress enacts a statute
that is vague or ambiguous about an issue that arises in a later lawsuit,
Congress implicitly delegates to the federal courts, and ultimately the
U.S. Supreme Court, the authority to resolve that ambiguity.215 When
a federal court exercises that delegated authority, the court is not just
deciding the case before it; it is making law for future cases.216
Specifically, the law made by a federal-court decision makes law for
all courts within the deciding court’s “jurisdictional ambit.”217 Thus,
Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1625, 1667–68 (2013) (arguing that weight of precedent
should depend on whether it rested on nonlegal considerations, whether or not the precedent
involved “constitutional adjudication”). Finally, many scholars have discussed whether the
horizontal stare decisis effect of statutory interpretation decisions should be stronger than that of
constitutional interpretation decisions, as the U.S. Supreme Court believes. E.g., Amy Coney
Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 317 (2005).
215. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984);
see also HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 146 (1949) (discussing “fiction”
that statutory gaps delegate authority to courts whose decisions construing those gaps make law in
form of precedent). Chevron itself requires us to qualify the statement in the text accompanying
this note. As Chevron explained, this delegation to the federal courts does not occur if Congress
has charged an administrative agency with administering the statute. Id. at 843. When Congress
delegates the task to an administrative agency, the legal force and effect of the agency’s
interpretation depends on whether “Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law,” and, if so, whether “the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27
(2001).
216. The Court in Chevron recognized that courts make law when they interpret federal statutes,
a recognition that is evident from the Court’s citation to Roscoe Pound’s THE SPIRIT OF THE
COMMON LAW. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.10. At the pages in Pound’s book cited by the
Chevron Court, Pound writes that when a court cannot resolve a statutory interpretation issue
because of the lack of clear legislative intent, “[T]he courts, willing or unwilling, must to some
extent make the law under the guise of interpretation.” ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE
COMMON LAW 174 (1921); see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 525, 549
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be
unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law.”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The whole theory of lawful congressional delegation is . . . that a
certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action
. . . .”). But cf. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24–28 (1994) (making cogent arguments about
the conceptual difficulties of treating judicial decisions as positive law).
217. Schauer, supra note 147, at 592. By using the term “jurisdictional ambit” in the text
accompanying this note, I mean to avoid the hard question whether the Supreme Court’s decisions
are binding precedent for federal executive branch officials. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 43–44 &
n.3 & 71 n.127 (1993) (arguing that federal executive-branch officials should treat federal court
decisions as explanations of judgments, rather than as legally binding precedent, but not endorsing
comparable treatment of higher court precedent by lower court judges).

50.2 SEAMON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

ANALYZING JAMES V. CITY OF BOISE

9/11/18 8:54 PM

215

when a U.S. Supreme Court decision interprets a federal statute to
resolve a case, the decision makes law binding on all lower federal and
state courts. The Court’s decision establishes a “law[] . . . made in
Pursuance” of the Constitution and therefore the Supremacy Clause
compels obedience by all other courts.218 The statutory interpretation
adopted in the decision is as binding “as if written into the statute[]
itself.”219
Under the analysis just proposed, the state courts’ duty to obey
the Court’s federal-law decisions rests on (1) Congress’s implicit
218. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. Besides Chevron, the Court has recognized in other contexts
that Congress can delegate law-making power to the federal courts through broadly worded statutes,
and that federal court precedent interpreting those statutes can preempt conflicting state law under
the Supremacy Clause. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456–57 (1957)
(holding that federal Labor Management Relations Act authorizes federal courts to fashion
substantive federal law “from the policy of our national labor laws,” and that this judge-made law
can have preemptive effect); see also Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1028–30 (1967) (discussing Lincoln Mills).
Contrary to the distinction I suggest between U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal
statutes and U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution, one could argue that, in
ratifying the Constitution, the people delegated to the Court the power to interpret the Constitution
with binding effect. This argument, pointed out by Jim Pfander in personal correspondence (on file
with the author), provides a delegation theory that would support Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958). In a like vein, Evan Caminker pointed out in personal correspondence on file with the author
that if Congress’s delegation of interpretive authority to the U.S. Supreme Court does not depend
on actual congressional intent to delegate—but instead inheres in the nature of enacting legislation
that is bound to be ambiguous in certain applications—then one can similarly justify the Court’s
authority to interpret the Constitution.
219. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 317 (1926) (making this statement with reference to
state supreme court’s interpretation of state statute); see also Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. 152,
160 (1825) (stating that courts of Nation A “have no more discretion” to depart from Nation B’s
courts’ interpretation of Nation B’s statute “than to depart from the words of the statute”). As
explained in the text, the proposal made here requires state courts to treat the Court’s decisions
interpreting federal statutes the same as the statutes themselves. Professor Merrill described this
equation of a court’s interpretation with the interpreted document as the “incorporation
conception.” Merrill, supra note 206, at 62. Professor Merrill criticizes the incorporation
conception as a ground for requiring executive-branch officials to treat the Court’s precedent as
binding. Id. at 61–62. I take no position in this Article on whether the Court’s precedent binds
executive-branch officials. I recognize, however, that the proposal made in this Article might be
thought subject to Professor’s Merrill’s criticism that the incorporation model “is an incongruous
way of understanding judicial opinions.” Id. at 63. I believe that criticism is well-founded, however,
only to the extent that the incorporation conception is used as the basis for requiring federal
executive-branch officials to obey the Court’s precedent. In my view, it is not incongruous to say
that state courts must treat U.S. Supreme Court precedent as having the same status as the Acts of
Congress interpreted in that precedent. This is no more incongruous than to require executivebranch officials to treat the President’s executive orders as having the same status as federal
statutes, while recognizing that neither state courts nor federal courts must treat federal executive
orders as having the same status as federal statutes. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74
F.3d 1322, 1332–39 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that executive order conflicted with federal statute);
Marks v. CIA, 590 F.3d 997, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (same).
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delegation to the federal courts of law-making power when it enacts a
federal statute; (2) the Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III,
as construed in Martin; and (3) the Supremacy Clause.220 The
proposed analysis admittedly leaves open many questions, and the
author hopes to address them in a future work.221 For now, we will
turn to its application in James.

220. This proposal can be criticized as spreading my bets by relying on multiple legal bases,
none of which standing alone suffices to support the state courts’ duty to obey Supreme Court
precedent. For example, Dean Caminker and Professor Harrison have cogently argued that the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction cannot entirely account for vertical stare decisis. Dean Caminker
points out that in civil law jurisdictions, higher courts have appellate authority to reverse lower
court decisions but the decisions of those higher courts do not have binding precedential effect.
Caminker, supra note 6, at 821, 826. Thus, the existence of appellate jurisdiction does not
necessarily imply that the appellate court’s decisions have vertical stare decisis effect. In addition,
Professor Harrison writes that, “as late as 1914, the Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over
cases in which a state court decided in favor of a federal claim”; this strongly suggests that “the
rules of precedent do not simply follow from appellate jurisdiction.” Harrison, supra note 6, at 518,
519. The Ohio Supreme Court made a similar point in an 1859 decision denying the binding effect
of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Skelly v. Jefferson Bank Branch of Ohio, 9 Ohio St. 606, 622
(1859).
221. The proposal’s reliance on Chevron, for example, raises the question of the legal basis for
Chevron, which is a source of continuing disagreement among legal scholars. See RICHARD HENRY
SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 804–05 (2013). To the extent that Chevron reflects a canon of
statutory interpretation, as scholars have suggested, e.g., Abbe Gluck, Symposium, What 30 Years
of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 609
(2014), I’d argue that the proposal made here is more defensible as a canon of statutory construction
than Chevron because the proposal implements the “political axiom[]” teaching “the propriety of
the judicial power of a government being co-extensive with its legislative.” THE FEDERALIST NO.
80, at 476 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). True, “[n]o legislative history suggests that Congress has
ever embraced the doctrine of hierarchical precedent.” Caminker, supra note 6, at 839, but Congress
surely has long legislated against a now-well-settled understanding of the state courts’ duty to obey
Supreme Court precedent. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 1006 (1992) (stating that “the norm of following precedent is ubiquitous in the
Anglo-American legal system”); see also, e.g., Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501
U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (referring to “presumption” of statutory interpretation under which “Congress
is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles”). Cf. Abbe
R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study
of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 990–1015
(2013) (reporting and discussing empirical evidence on congressional awareness of Chevron and
related interpretive doctrines). Professor Benjamin Cover has suggested in personal correspondence
on file with the author that Chevron’s delegation rationale for deferring to an agency’s statutory
interpretation depends on the existence of statutory ambiguity. No similar condition can exist under
my theory for justifying the state courts’ obligation to obey U.S. Supreme Court decisions
interpreting federal statutes. That point is illustrated in James itself: The Idaho Supreme Court did
not think it was bound by U.S. Supreme Court case law interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because, in
the Idaho Supreme Court’s view, U.S. Supreme Court case law conflicted with the language of the
statute. James, 351 P.3d at 1192. To use Chevron terminology, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded
that the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation failed “Chevron step one.” E.g., Nat’l Cable &
Telecomm Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). Professor Cover also has
observed in personal correspondence on file with the author that potential separation-of-powers

50.2 SEAMON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

ANALYZING JAMES V. CITY OF BOISE

9/11/18 8:54 PM

217

In James, the Idaho Supreme Court did not claim the freedom to
disregard all U.S. Supreme Court decisions on federal law. Rather, it
claimed the freedom only to disregard certain Court decisions
interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Specifically, the Idaho court claimed
that it was not bound by Hughes v. Rowe or by the decision on which
Hughes relied, Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC.222 One of the
reasons it gave was specious.223 The other was more substantial: The
Idaho court emphasized that 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) authorizes “the
court” to award attorney’s fees “in its discretion.”224 The Idaho court
thought that the U.S. Supreme Court lacks authority to “limit the
discretion of state courts where such limitation is not contained in the
statute.”225 In short, the Idaho court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) to
give state courts discretion that the U.S. Supreme Court cannot limit
through nontextual limitations like the “frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation” standard of Christiansburg and Hughes.226
The Idaho court was wrong under the proposal made here. Under
that proposal, the U.S. Supreme Court’s delegated authority to
concerns arise from my delegation rationale for the state courts’ duty to obey U.S. Supreme Court
decisions interpreting federal statutes.
222. James v. City of Boise, 351 P.3d 1171, 1192 (Idaho 2015), rev’d 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016)
(discussing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), and Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5 (1980)).
223. The Idaho Supreme Court suggested that Christiansburg and Hughes do not bind state
courts because they were “appeals from cases in federal district courts.” James, 351 P.3d at 1192.
Although the Court in Christiansburg described the standard that it adopted as the one that “should
inform a district court’s discretion,” 434 U.S. at 417 (emphasis added), that description simply
reflected one or more of three circumstances: (1) the case before it arose in a district court, id. at
415; (2) the case presented a question “about which the federal courts ha[d] expressed divergent
views,” id. at 414; and (3) at the time of Christiansburg, most actions under Title VII, whose feeshifting provision was at issue in Christiansburg, were brought in federal courts, not state courts.
As to the last circumstance, the Court did not decide until 1990 that state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII actions. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820,
823–826 (1990). Moreover, neither Christiansburg nor Hughes presented a situation in which a
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court does not bind a state court. For example, the decisions in
Christiansburg and Hughes did not interpret a federal statute that applied only in the federal courts.
Cf. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (holding that Idaho Supreme Court was not bound
by U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal statute governing appeals from lower federal
courts). Nor did Christiansburg and Hughes rest on the Court’s supervisory power over the lower
federal courts. See generally Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 345–46 (2006).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012), quoted in James, 351 P.3d at 1192.
225. James, 351 P.3d at 1192.
226. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14 (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421). It is a hard question—
and one beyond the scope of this Article—whether Congress could delegate to state courts final
authority to construe federal statutes in cases within their jurisdiction—without the possibility of
U.S. Supreme Court review. Cf. Bellia, supra note 6, at 862–77 (discussing whether Congress could
constitutionally delegate power authorizing state courts to make federal common law).
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interpret federal statutes with binding effect does not depend on
whether its interpretation rests on specific statutory text. To conclude
otherwise would deprive the Court’s statutory interpretation decisions
of binding effect in many cases, presumably including ones in which
dissenting Justices claimed that the majority’s decision lacked an
adequate textual foundation.227 The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision
in James, for example, would be vindicated by Justice Thomas’s view
that “Christiansburg mistakenly cast aside the statutory language to
give effect to equitable considerations.”228 Justice Thomas might be
right, but the erroneousness of a Court decision does not justify a lower
federal or state court in disregarding it. Indeed, the whole idea of
vertical stare decisis is that a lower court must obey a superior court’s
precedent even if the lower court thinks it is wrong.229 Moreover, even
if a method of statutory interpretation—say, a coin toss—could depart
so far from accepted methods to warrant disregard of the Court’s
statutory-interpretation decisions, the Court’s reliance on “equitable
considerations” in Christiansburg (and Hughes)230—which it coupled
with consideration of legislative purposes evident in legislative
history231—did not disqualify the Court’s decisions from constituting
a “Law[] of the United States” binding on state courts under the
Supremacy Clause.232

227. The dissents in Obergefell were cited by a state supreme court justice who doubts that
Obergefell binds state courts. Czekala–Chatham v. State ex rel. Hood, No. 2014-CA-00008-SCT,
2015 WL 10985118, at *17 (Miss. Nov. 5, 2015) (Coleman, J., objecting to the order with separate
written statement) (“If the four dissenters are correct, then the United States Supreme Court in
Obergefell arguably has done something it has no power under the Constitution of the United States
to do.”).
228. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 538 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
229. See Caminker, supra note 6, at 818 (stating that under the doctrine of vertical stare decisis
(or “hierarchical precedent,” as Professor Caminker calls it), “a lower court judge must view herself
‘as the simple (and perhaps simple-minded) enforcer of the Supreme Court’s dictates, however
wise or unwise they may appear to the hapless judge below.’”) (quoting Sanford Levinson, On
Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25
CONN. L. REV. 843, 845 (1993)).
230. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418–19 (explaining that “equitable considerations” warrant
interpreting Title VII’s fee-shifting provision to impose different standards for fee awards,
depending on whether the plaintiff or the defendant prevails); see also Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14
(stating that Court could “perceive no reason for applying a less stringent standard” than adopted
in Christiansburg for awarding fees to prevailing defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012)).
231. See Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 836 n.3 (2011) (explaining that decision in Christiansburg
and other precedent on federal fee-shifting statutes reflected “legislative purposes”).
232. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 1. Relevant to the question of whether the Court’s interpretive
methods should ever disqualify its decisions from having precedential effect, some of the current
opposition to the Court’s Obergefell decision justifies disregarding it because it “lack[s] anything
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Thus, the proposal made here reaches the same conclusion about
the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in James as the U.S. Supreme
Court did. Unlike the Court’s decision, however, the proposal
accurately reflects the narrow grounds on which the Idaho Supreme
Court refused to be bound by the Court’s precedent. Moreover, the
proposal aims, like Dean Caminker’s seminal article, to offer an
alternative to thinking about vertical stare decisis as a unitary
doctrine.233 This is particularly important when the binding nature of
the Court’s decisions interpreting the Constitution—as distinguished
from its decisions interpreting Acts of Congress—remains mired in
controversy.234
The Court’s current precedent, however, does not make this
distinction. Consequently, the Court could not have adopted the
proposal made here without granting plenary consideration in James.
And, in that event, the Court probably would have had to
acknowledge—in light of the shallowness and murkiness of its
precedent—that, after all, James is not an easy case. The effort might
have been worthwhile, considering the Idaho Supreme Court’s
response to the Court’s curt summary reversal, which is the subject of
the next (and last substantive) part of this Article.
IV. JAMES ON REMAND
If the U.S. Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in James v. City
of Boise was curt, the Idaho Supreme Court’s response on remand was
even curter, amounting to sullen silence. On remand, the Idaho
Supreme Court withdrew its original opinion and issued a “substitute
opinion.”235 The substitute opinion did not mention the Court’s
summary reversal. The substitute opinion simply omitted the language
in the original opinion that denied the binding nature of
remotely resembling a warrant in the text, logic, structure, or original understanding of the
Constitution.” AM. PRINCIPLES PROJECT, supra note 78.
233. Caminker, supra note 6, at 822 (concluding that “no single rationale persuasively accounts
for the entire doctrine” of hierarchical precedent).
234. Compare, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 124, at 724 (arguing that “the original understanding
[of the Constitution] must give way in the face of transformative or longstanding precedent”), with
Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 24
(1994) (arguing that “[t]he authority of precedent . . . in some of its most familiar applications, . . .
is unconstitutional”).
235. James v. City of Boise City, No. 42053, 2016 WL 1162984 (Idaho Mar. 23, 2016); see
also Idaho Supreme Court Civil Opinions, IDAHO SUP. CT., https://isc.idaho.gov/appealscourt/isc_civil (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (entry for release date of March 23, 2016, indicating
release of “substitute opinion” in James).
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Christiansburg and Hughes. It also omitted the language in the
original opinion that explained why the court was awarding fees
against Ms. James under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Without explanation,
the substitute opinion concluded, “The appeal regarding the dismissal
of James’s claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 was totally without
foundation.”236
The Idaho Supreme Court’s actions on remand illustrate two ways
in which the U.S. Supreme Court inadequately protects federal civil
rights. First, state courts can easily avoid the Court’s precedent.
Second, the Court’s precedent on the federal civil rights statutes at
issue in James are reasonably read to permit punishment of civil rights
plaintiffs like that imposed by the Idaho Supreme Court on Ms. James.
A. State Court Avoidance of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
As described above, on remand the Idaho Supreme Court
awarded fees against Ms. James on the ground that her appeal of her
Section 1983 claim was “totally without foundation.”237 If the court
had done this in its original opinion, it never would have attracted U.S.
Supreme Court attention, even if it had grossly misapplied the Court’s
standard for fee awards. As legal scholars have pointed out, state
courts have great freedom to ignore the Court’s precedent.238
The freedom has two main sources. First, the Court reviews few
state-court cases. In the most recent Term, it reviewed only twenty
cases from the state courts. 239 Overall, the Court grants only about one

236. James, 2016 WL 1162984, at *55. Although the Idaho Supreme Court on remand
reaffirmed the fee award against Ms. James, attorneys for the defendants had already withdrawn
their request for those fees. Defendants-Respondents’ Withdrawal of Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees, James v. City of Boise City, No. 42053, 2016 WL 1162984 (Idaho Mar. 23, 2016).
237. James, 2016 WL 1162984, at *55.
238. Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 980
(2010) (arguing that “there are areas of the law where state courts have, as a practical matter, the
ability to determine what the Constitution means with little or no oversight by the Supreme Court”);
Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 501 (2008) (arguing that
state courts occasionally “disobey Supreme Court precedent,” often because “the Court itself has
invited them to”); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below
Constitutional Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 227, 229–30 (2008) (arguing that state courts often interpret
federal law to go both above and below the “floor” of federal constitutional rights).
239. See Final October Term 2015 Stat Pack, Make-Up of the Merits Docket, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 29, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/final-october-term-2015-stat-pack/.
(indicating that the total appellate docket comprised eighty-six cases, twenty of which came from
state courts).
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percent of the certiorari petitions that it receives each term.240 Second,
state courts can write their opinions to avoid falling within that one
percent. They can, for example, decide federal issues by mouthing the
right words from the Court’s precedent and limiting or omitting
explanations.241
That is what the Idaho Supreme Court did on remand in James.
And so, just as the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary reversal sent a
reproachful signal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Supreme
Court’s action on remand sent a recalcitrant reply. And just as the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision sent a broader signal to state courts
everywhere reaffirming their subordinacy to the Court, the Idaho
Supreme Court’s action on remand, coupled with its original decision,
sent a signal to Section 1983 plaintiffs: Stay out of the Idaho state
courts. The Idaho court’s action on remand reminds the rest of us of
the reality that state courts often have the last word on the meaning of
federal law.242
Given that reality, federal-rights claimants in state courts must
depend on the competence, carefulness, and, perhaps most
importantly, the good faith of those courts. As Professor Bator said:
Ideally, we hope that state judges will conceive of the
supreme federal law to be part of their own law, not an alien
intrusion. We want state judges to think of themselves as
really being charged, “equally with the courts of the Union,”
with an obligation to “guard, enforce, and protect every right
granted or secured by the Constitution.”243
To support that role, the Court might have done better in James
by discussing the actual grounds on which the Idaho Supreme Court
declined to follow two particular Court decisions. As explained above,
the Idaho court did not broadly disclaim all obligation to obey the
240. RICHARD SEAMON ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT SOURCEBOOK 173 (2013); see also
Harvard Law Review Editorial Staff, The Statistics, The Supreme Court 2014 Term, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 381, 389, Table II(B) (2015) (reporting that Court granted 1% of all certiorari petitions filed
during October 2014 Term).
241. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (stating that “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when
the asserted error consists of . . . the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law”).
242. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59
VAND. L. REV. 501, 1505–06 (2006) (“In reality, state court judgments resting upon the
interpretation of federal statutes may—indeed, in the overwhelming majority of cases today, do—
govern the rights and duties of parties subject to them without Supreme Court review.”).
243. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605, 624 (1981) (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).
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Court’s precedent.244 The Court might also have acknowledged, and
sought to supplement, its shallow and muddy precedent on the state
courts’ duty to obey its precedent.245 These critiques, of course, benefit
from hindsight and academic distance.246 Even so, the point remains
that the Idaho court’s recalcitrance is understanding if not excusable.
The next section of this Article makes a similar point about the
Idaho Supreme Court’s award of attorney’s fees against Ms. James.
Even though the award was erroneous, it was understandable
considering the Court’s precedent, which poorly protects federal civil
rights plaintiffs like Melene James.
B. U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Undermining Enforcement of
Federal Civil Rights, and Its Application in James
Just as the Idaho Supreme Court’s recalcitrance on remand was
an understandable though improper response to the Court’s summary
reversal, the Idaho Court’s award of attorney’s fees against Ms. James
was an understandable though erroneous ruling on the merits. To
explain this conclusion, this section describes the basic precedent and
then examines the Idaho Supreme Court’s application of that
precedent. In the latter effort, this section examines specific areas in
which the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent is undeveloped or unclear.
The thesis of this section is that this precedent inadequately protects
federal civil rights.
1. U.S. Supreme Court Precedent on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988
U.S. Supreme Court precedent entitles defendants who prevail in
suits brought against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to get attorney’s
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) if “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous,
244. See supra text accompanying notes 45–54.
245. Cf. Alex Hemmer, Courts as Managers: American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock and
Summary Disposition at the Roberts Court, 122 YALE L.J. 209, 223 (2013) (discussing danger that
Court will use summary opinions “where they are simply inappropriate, because they make new
law”) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/courts-as-managersamerican-tradition-partnership-v-bullock-and-summary-disposition-at-the-roberts-court.
246. As one of the lawyers for Ms. James at the cert petition stage, I argued for summary
reversal of the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision. See James Cert Petition, supra note 36, at 39;
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.2, James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016) (No. 15–493).
From the client’s standpoint, this disposition was better than a grant of certiorari followed by
plenary consideration. Only after the Court’s summary reversal did I have the chance, as a law
professor, to examine and reflect on the relevant precedent and scholarship. Thus, the remarks in
the text questioning the wisdom of the Court’s summary disposition do (try to) benefit from
hindsight and academic distance.
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unreasonable, or without foundation.”247 When the defendants in a
Section 1983 suit are police officers, one way they can prevail is by
successfully invoking qualified immunity. The Court’s precedent on
qualified immunity establishes a two-pronged analysis:
Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from
money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1)
that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of
the challenged conduct.248
The Court’s precedent allows lower federal and state courts to “decide
which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity to tackle first.”249 The
Court itself regularly decides qualified immunity cases under the
second, “clearly established” prong, without reaching the merits of the
underlying constitutional claims.250
Under the Court’s precedent, qualified immunity has the avowed
purpose and the regular effect of protecting officials even from
meritorious constitutional claims. That purpose is reflected in Court
decisions stating that qualified immunity protects officials unless they
are “plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate the law.”251 The
effect of qualified immunity is reflected in the cases in which the Court
has upheld qualified immunity for officials whom, it has also found,
violated the Constitution.252 Thus, when a court rules that a defendant
247. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)).
248. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).
249. Id.
250. E.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (holding that police
officers had qualified immunity from excessive-force claim without deciding “whether there was a
Fourth Amendment violation”); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044–45 (2015) (per curiam)
(holding that prison officials sued for causing inmate’s suicide had qualified immunity without
deciding constitutionality of their conduct); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per
curiam) (holding that police officer had qualified immunity from Fourth Amendment claim without
deciding whether Fourth Amendment violation occurred); see also Karen M. Blum, Section 1983
Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 927–30 (2015)
(discussing cases in which Court has decided qualified immunity issue without addressing whether
constitutional rights were violated).
251. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord, e.g., Mullenix, 136
S. Ct. at 308.
252. E.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378–83 (2014) (holding that plaintiff’s firing
violated First Amendment, but defendant had qualified immunity from individual-capacity claims);
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009) (holding that strip search of
public school student violated Fourth Amendment, but defendant schools officials were
“nevertheless protected from liability through qualified immunity”); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 605–06 (1999) (holding that officers violated Fourth Amendment by inviting media

50.2 SEAMON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

224

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

9/11/18 8:54 PM

[Vol. 50:175

has qualified immunity, that ruling signifies that the defendant did not
violate the plaintiff’s clearly established rights; the ruling does not,
however, necessarily mean that the defendant did not violate the
plaintiff’s rights at all.
2. The Idaho Supreme Court’s Application of U.S. Supreme Court
Qualified-Immunity Precedent in James
In James, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded in its substitute
opinion that Ms. James’ appeal of her excessive-force claim under
Section 1983 was “totally without foundation.”253 Although the
substitute opinion does not explain the court’s conclusion, in its
original opinion the Idaho court determined that “[i]t was clear that
[Ms. James’] claim would be barred by qualified immunity under the
clearly established law of the ninth circuit, and [Ms. James] did not
cite any law to the contrary.”254 As U.S. Supreme Court precedent
permits, the Idaho Supreme Court never determined whether the
police violated Ms. James’ constitutional rights by using excessive
force.255 Instead, the Idaho court believed that when the challenged
conduct occurred, Ms. James’ rights clearly were not clearly
established.
Supreme Court precedent makes it all too easy for a court to
conclude that the rights asserted by a civil rights plaintiff clearly were
not clearly established. That is because the Court’s precedent on the
“clearly established” standard is highly unclear.256 For one thing, the
precedent leaves unclear the level of generality at which courts should
frame the right at stake when determining if that right was clearly
established. 257 The precedent also leaves unclear what sources of law
courts should consult to determine whether the right was clearly

representatives inside a private home to view execution of arrest warrant, but officers had qualified
immunity).
253. James v. City of Boise, No. 42053, 2016 WL 1162984, at *55 (Idaho Mar. 23, 2016).
254. James v. City of Boise, 351 P.3d 1171, 1192 (Idaho 2015), rev’d 136 S. Ct. 685 (2016).
255. Id. at 1178 (noting that court will address only whether the right that defendants allegedly
violated was clearly established when alleged violation occurred); see also id. at 1193 (Jim Jones,
J., concurring) (“Because we hold that qualified immunity supported the dismissal on summary
judgment of James’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it was not necessary to consider the merits of
that claim.”).
256. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851,
852 (2010) (stating that “determining whether an officer violated ‘clearly established’ law has
proved to be a mare’s nest of complexity and confusion”).
257. See id. at 854–58.
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established. 258 Because of these and other flaws, Professor John
Jeffries said, “The existing law of qualified immunity is complicated,
unstable, and overprotective of government officers.”259
These flaws infected the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in
James. The Idaho court defined the right at stake in highly specific
terms: It was the right to be free from “the use of a police dog to find
and subdue by biting a suspected burglar in a dark basement after the
suspect failed to respond to police announcements stating to surrender
or a police dog would be sent that would find and bite him or her.”260
Not surprisingly, Idaho case law lacked precedent recognizing or
rejecting this micro-right. The Idaho court relied on this lack of
precedent plus supposedly contrary precedent in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Idaho court did not consider case
law in other federal circuits.261
The Idaho Supreme Court’s qualified immunity analysis, though
arguably supported and certainly not foreclosed by the Court’s
precedent, unjustly stacks the deck against Section 1983 plaintiffs. For
one thing, the approach forces plaintiffs to find favorable precedent
with nearly identical facts. This is a fool’s game. After all, it is easy to
imagine situations where the use of a police dog to bite and hold a
suspect—a suspected jaywalker, for instance—would violate clearly
established law even without controlling precedent so holding.262 For
another thing, just because the law is clearly established by case law
within a circuit, or even in multiple circuits, that does not mean the
law is correct.263 Finally, the Idaho court did not even base the fee
258. See id. at 858–59.
259. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 250
(2013) (footnote omitted); see also Blum, supra note 239, at 913–14 (stating that “[t]here is a
growing consensus among practitioners, scholars, and judges that Section 1983 is no longer serving
its original and intended function as a vehicle for remedying violations of constitutional rights, that
it is broken in many ways, and that it is sorely in need of repairs”).
260. James, 351 P.3d at 1179.
261. When they cannot find binding precedent, the Idaho courts often consult Ninth Circuit
precedent but treat them only as persuasive. See, e.g., State v. Hawkins, 363 P.3d 348, 355 (Idaho
2015) (stating that Ninth Circuit decision was “not controlling precedent”); State v. Abdullah, 348
P.3d 1, 93–4 (Idaho 2015) (declining to follow Ninth Circuit case law on federal constitutional
issue).
262. Cf. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (“There has never been . . . a section
1983 case accusing welfare officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow that
if such a case arose, the officials would be immune from damages [or criminal] liability.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
263. See Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1098 (2013) (“Disagreeing with the lower
federal courts is not the same as ignoring federal law.”); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.
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award against Ms. James on its own, binding precedent—but instead
relied on precedent that was merely persuasive—in concluding that it
was “frivolous” for Ms. James to appeal a claim that binding precedent
neither supported nor rejected—a claim whose sin, in the court’s eyes,
was its novelty.264
3. The Idaho Supreme Court’s Application of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Precedent on Fee-Shifting Provisions in
Federal Civil Rights Statutes
By using the U.S. Supreme Court’s highly restrictive qualified
immunity precedent not only to reject Ms. James’ excessive-force
claim but also to award attorney’s fees against her under 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b), the Idaho Supreme Court added insult to injury. This
subsection briefly describes why U.S. Supreme Court precedent
arguably supports this compounding of the injury but should not be
interpreted that way.
At the time of James, it was unclear whether a court could
consider the defendant’s defenses, as well as the plaintiff’s claims, in
determining whether “the plaintiff’s action was frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation” and thus warranted awarding
fees to a prevailing defendant under Section 1988(b).265 The version
of the Court’s standard quoted in the last sentence—which comes from
Hughes (quoting Christiansburg)—calls for evaluation of the
plaintiff’s “action,” a term that means the entire lawsuit, including
both claims and defenses.266 But the Court has often—including in
Virginia. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 532 U.S. 598, 621 (2001) (“[O]ur opinions sometimes
contradict the unanimous and longstanding interpretation of lower federal courts.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original)).
264. Reflecting the perils of relying on another jurisdiction’s precedent, the Idaho Supreme
Court misunderstood Ninth Circuit precedent. Both before and after the Idaho court’s decision in
James, the Ninth Circuit held that police dog attacks can constitute excessive force. Lowry v. City
of San Diego, 818 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), reh’g granted, 2016 WL 4932643 (Sept. 16,
2016) (reversing summary judgment against plaintiff on his claim that use of police dog constituted
excessive force); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 700–04 (9th Cir. 2005). Beyond that, as
Evan Caminker pointed out in personal correspondence on file with the author, there is a special
irony in the Idaho Supreme Court’s reliance on 9th Circuit precedent in its qualified immunity
analysis, even while the Idaho court denied the binding effect of U.S. Supreme Court precedent in
the standard for awarding attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988!
265. James, 351 P.3d at 1192 (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980)).
266. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14; see also Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 829 (2011) (“We have held
that a defendant may receive such an award if the plaintiff’s suit is frivolous.” (emphasis added)).
See generally BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91–4 (2006) (construing statutory term
“action” to mean judicial proceeding); Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1991) (defining
“action” to mean “[a] civil or criminal proceeding”).
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Christiansburg—described the standard as applying only to the
plaintiff’s “claims.”267 Thus, Supreme Court precedent did not
foreclose the Idaho Supreme Court’s reliance in James on the qualified
immunity defense to award fees against Ms. James under 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b).
Moreover, the Idaho court’s approach gains support from a
decision that the Court issued last Term after James: CRST Van
Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC.268 CRST involved the fee-shifting provision
in Title VII, but it has relevance for cases involving 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b) because the Court has always construed the two statutes in
pari materia.269 After briefly describing CRST and why it can be read
to support the Idaho Supreme Court’s approach in James, this
subsection will explain why CRST should not be so read.
CRST addressed how to determine whether a defendant is a
“prevailing party” under Title VII’s fee-shifting provision.270 The
precise question was whether the defendant can be a “prevailing party”
only “by obtaining a ruling on the merits.”271 In CRST, the defendant
CRST, a trucking company, won the suit filed against it by the EEOC
because of the EEOC’s failure to follow procedures that Title VII
required the EEOC to follow before suing.272 EEOC’s failure to follow
these pre-suit procedures was raised by the defendant CRST as a
defense.273 For purposes of its decision, the Court assumed that the
judgment in CRST’s favor dismissing the EEOC’s suit was not a
“ruling on the merits.”274

267. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978), quoted in CRST Van
Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1646 (2016).
268. 136 S. Ct. 1642 (2016).
269. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 532
U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001) (stating that Court “ha[s] interpreted these fee-shifting provisions
consistently”); Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14 (stating that, although Christiansburg construed Title VII’s
fee-shifting provision, and “arguably a different standard might be applied in a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” Court “perceive[d] no reason for applying a less stringent standard” for
awarding fees against Section 1983 plaintiffs than Christiansburg adopted for awarding fees
against Title VII plaintiffs).
270. 136 S. Ct. at 1646.
271. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
272. Id. at 1651 (stating that court of appeals’ decision “preclud[ed] [CRST] from recovering
attorney’s fees when the claims in question have been dismissed because the Commission failed to
satisfy its presuit obligations”).
273. Id. at 1648–49.
274. Id. at 1650.
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The Court held in CRST that a defendant can be a “prevailing
party” without getting a judgment “on the merits.”275 Because the
Court had not previously addressed the requirements for a defendant
to be a “prevailing party,” the Court relied on prior decisions in which
it had addressed when a prevailing defendant should be awarded fees
as a matter of discretion.276 Thus, the Court in CRST examined the
congressional policy underlying Christiansburg’s “frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation” standard.277 That policy was “to
deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation,” thereby “sparing
defendants from the costs of frivolous litigation.”278 The policy did not
depend on “the distinction between merits-based and non-meritsbased frivolity.”279 The Court explained in CSRT that although a
defendant “might prefer a judgment vindicating its position regarding
the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s allegations,” the defendant
achieves its primary objective—i.e., to prevent “a material alteration”
of its legal relationship to the plaintiff “to the extent it is in the
plaintiff’s favor”—”even if the court’s final judgment rejects the
plaintiff’s claim for a non-merits reason.”280 Therefore, the Court
concluded in CRST, “Congress must have intended that a defendant
could recover fees expended in frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless
litigation when the case is resolved in the defendant’s favor, whether
on the merits or not.”281
The reasoning of CRST suggests that courts can consider defenses
in determining whether a plaintiff’s action is “frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation.”282 The Court in CRST determined that a
defendant can be a prevailing party even if the court does not vindicate
the defendant’s position on the “substantive merits” of the plaintiff’s
claims.283 Logic suggests that “litigation” can also be “frivolous,
unreasonable or groundless” even if the defendant does not prevail on
275. Id. at 1653 (concluding that “[n]either the text of the fee-shifting statute nor the policy
which underpins it counsels in favor of adopting the Court of Appeals’ on-the-merits requirement”).
276. Id. at 1646.
277. Id. at 1651–53.
278. Id. at 1652 (quoting, respectively, Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,
420 (1978) and Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 840 (2011)).
279. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1652.
280. Id. at 1651-52.
281. Id. at 1652.
282. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (adopting “frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation” standard for awarding fees to prevailing defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)).
283. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1652.
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the “substantive merits.”284 And if a court must consider a non-meritsbased defense to determine whether the defendant is a prevailing
party, it is hard to argue that the court must then disregard that same
defense in determining whether the “litigation” is frivolous.
As discussed above, a defendant can win a Section 1983 lawsuit
based on qualified immunity even if the plaintiff’s claim of a
constitutional violation has merit.285 CRST accordingly suggests that
such a non-merits-based victory not only makes the defendant a
“prevailing party” but should also be considered in determining
whether the plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation.”286 Nonetheless, the availability of a successful qualifiedimmunity defense will seldom, if ever, be a proper basis for a fee
award against a Section 1983 plaintiff, even if the ultimate success of
that defense seems clear to a court in hindsight. This is so for three
reasons.
First, reliance on qualified immunity to award fees against
Section 1983 plaintiffs will deter Section 1983 plaintiffs from
asserting meritorious claims of constitutional violations, especially
novel claims. As Professor Chen has said, “Private enforcement of
constitutional claims is driven in large part by the availability of
attorney’s fees.”287 If Section 1983 plaintiffs face a risk of not only not
recovering their own attorney’s fees but also having to pay the
defendants’ attorney’s fees—which is a high risk because of the
Court’s current precedent on qualified immunity—many will go
without remedies for their constitutional injuries. This is unjust.
Second, as would-be Section 1983 plaintiffs quail at the risk of
paying the defendants’ attorney’s fees, meritorious constitutional
claims not only go unremedied but also unadjudicated. Scholars have
criticized the Court’s current qualified-immunity precedent because it
encourages courts to avoid adjudicating constitutional claims by
finding the relevant law not “clearly established.”288 The resulting
stagnation of constitutional law could only get worse if courts begin
284. See id. at 1651–52.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 236–41.
286. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1651-52.
287. Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape,
78 UMKC L. REV. 889, 914 (2010) (citation omitted).
288. E.g., Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2015) (stating that “[m]any scholars fear” that current precedent will cause
constitutional law to “stagnate” and presenting empirical evidence supporting that fear).
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relying on successful qualified immunity defenses to award fees
against plaintiffs asserting constitutional rights.
Third, the qualified immunity defense differs from other defenses
in ways that make it an improper basis for awarding fees against
plaintiffs.289 Qualified immunity aims to ensure that executive-branch
officials make decisions without the fear of being sued.290 The
rationale is that this fear might prevent them from making wise
decisions.291 So, qualified immunity benefits the public at the expense
of people whose rights the officials have violated. Even assuming—as
the qualified immunity doctrine does—that it’s fair to make them bear
the cost of going without a monetary remedy for those violations, it’s
hardly fair to add the monetary burden of paying the officials’
attorney’s fees. This is especially unfair because those fees usually are
incurred not by the officials but by their government employer.292
Ultimately, relying on qualified immunity as a basis for awarding
fees against plaintiffs would “distort” the litigation of constitutional
rights in a way that Congress could not have intended when it enacted
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).293 The common sense of this conclusion becomes
apparent when you consider the result of a contrary conclusion in
James. Because there was no precedent in the Idaho court system
either supporting or defeating Ms. James’ claim, the Idaho Supreme
Court could have decided, contrary to its view of the state of the law
289. The Court has recognized qualified immunity’s distinctiveness in contexts other than
determining fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012). See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692,
700–09 (2011) (holding that, on petition for writ of certiorari filed by defendant official in § 1983
action, U.S. Supreme Court can review court of appeals’ determination that official violated
Constitution, even though court of appeals ruled in official’s favor based on qualified immunity);
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305–12 (1996) (allowing successive interlocutory appeals of
district court rulings denying qualified immunity defenses if rulings turn on issues of law).
290. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982).
291. Id. at 814. This rationale is undermined in the context of police conduct cases by empirical
evidence that police officers are usually indemnified for any damages and attorney’s fees awarded
against them. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885,
891 (2014).
292. Dina Mishra, When the Interests of Municipalities and Their Officials Diverge: Municipal
Dual Representation and Conflicts of Interest in § 1983 Litigation, 119 YALE L.J. 86, 88 (2009)
(stating that “because many of the same facts and elements relate to § 1983 claims against
municipalities as to § 1983 claims against municipal officials in their individual capacity, the same
legal team frequently will defend both a municipality and its official in a § 1983 case”); John C.
Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 50 (1998)
(“In most jurisdictions, the state’s readiness to defend and indemnify constitutional tort claims
[against state officials] is a policy rather than a statutory requirement, but it is nonetheless
routine.”).
293. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978).
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in the Ninth Circuit, that Ms. James’ claim had merit: The police dog
attack amounted to unconstitutional excessive force. Yet the Idaho
court still could have held that the individual defendants clearly had
qualified immunity, and ordered Ms. James to pay their attorney’s
fees. This is nonsense.294
V. CONCLUSION
Melene James was bitten twice: first by a police dog, and then by
a state supreme court that had slipped the leash of vertical stare decisis.
Metaphors aside, an examination of James v. City of Boise yields
troubling insights into the U.S. Supreme Court’s supremacy in a time
of civil rights turmoil. The Court would have us believe that the state
courts’ duty to obey the Court’s precedent is long-established and
stands on a firm, constitutional footing. In reality, the Court’s
precedent is shallow—in the sense that only one of its decisions
expressly recognizes the duty in a holding, as distinguished from
dicta—and murky—in the sense that the Court’s precedent leaves
unclear what, if any, constitutional provision supports that duty. What
is more, the state courts’ compliance with this duty rests mainly on the
good faith of state court judges, as shown in James by the proceedings
on remand. Finally, and what might be most troubling, the Court’s role
in ensuring that state courts enforce federal rights is undermined by its
precedent on two major federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1988(b).
294. My research has located only one decision by a federal court of appeals addressing whether
a court should award attorney’s fees against a civil rights plaintiff under the Christiansburg/Hughes
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” standard. In that case, the Sixth Circuit held that
the defendants’ successful invocation of qualified immunity did not, standing alone, “compel[] an
award of attorney fees in Defendant’s favor.” Schropshire v. Smith, Nos. 94-3098, 94-3101, 1995
WL 118983, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 1995). In this Article, I do not argue that a court should never
consider any type of defense in awarding fees against plaintiffs under Section 1988(b). On the
contrary, it might be appropriate for a court to award fees against Section 1983 plaintiffs whose
claims, from the outset, are clearly barred by mootness, state sovereign immunity, or state judicial
immunity, as lower courts have held. C.W. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 784 F.3d 1237, 1247–
48 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding fee award against Title VII plaintiff in part because “outcome [was]
predetermined” by defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from money damages); EEOC v.
Propak Logistics, Inc., 746 F.3d 145, 152 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that fee award against Title VII
plaintiff was proper under Christiansburg when suit was “moot at its inception”); Palazzolo v.
Benson, No. 95-1067, 1996 WL 156699, at *3–4 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 1996). (per curiam) (affirming
award of fees against Section 1983 plaintiffs because “defendants pursued the challenged conduct
in the course of their judicial duties and, thus, were clearly entitled to judicial immunity”). For
reasons discussed in the text, the doctrine of qualified immunity is distinctive in ways that justify
distinctive treatment when awarding fees against Section 1983 plaintiffs.
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